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ABSTRACT 
 
I investigate whether cross-sectional differences among politically connected 
directors are associated with differences in tax avoidance behavior.  Recent research suggests 
that the presence of politically connected directors impacts firms’ tax avoidance. However, it 
is likely that the influence of a politically connected director depends on the characteristics of 
the politically connected director. I extend this line of research and explore instances where 
the influence of politically connected directors on tax avoidance is likely to vary. First, I 
examine whether the political profile of political directors is related to firms’ tax avoidance 
activities. Second, I examine whether the director’s relationship to the political party in 
power impacts firms’ tax avoidance. Finally, I examine whether the length of a director’s 
government service influences firms’ level of tax avoidance. I find evidence of an association 
between the characteristics of political directors and firms’ tax avoidance strategies, but there 
is variation in the extent of the benefit that some politically connected directors provide. My 
study is the first study to attempt to empirically identify underlying mechanisms by which 
political directors influence firms’ tax avoidance strategies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
  
Income tax represents a significant cost for many U.S. corporations. Despite its 
importance, there is substantial variation in the extent that firms avoid income taxes (Dyreng 
et al. 2008). Recent research finds that characteristics of individual board members, such as 
financial expertise (Armstrong et al. 2015; Robinson et al. 2012), and political connections 
(Kim and Zhang 2016; Brown et al. 2015) are associated with firms’ tax avoidance activities. 
This study examines whether the characteristics of politically connected directors influence 
firms’ tax avoidance behavior. 
Corporations often attempt to influence the political process to obtain economic 
benefits. Lobbying and contributions to political action committees (PACs) are two common 
ways firms develop political connections. Consistent with political connections providing 
valuable benefits, prior research finds that firms with greater lobbying expenditures and PAC 
contributions exhibit better accounting and market performance (e.g., Borisov et al. 2016; 
Hill et al. 2013; Chen et al. 2010), are more likely to receive government funding (Duchin 
and Sosyura 2012), and exhibit higher levels of tax avoidance (Kim and Zhang 2016; Brown 
et al. 2015; Alexander et al. 2009). However, lobbying and PAC contributions are considered 
complimentary activities in the sense that PACs only provide access to legislators to make 
firms more eligible for lobbying (Kim 2008). Furthermore, both activities are useful only for 
specific issues (Kim 2008) with specific politicians (Vidal et al. 2012).  
An alternative mechanism to gain political influence is to appoint directors with 
political experience to the board. Politically connected directors potentially create broad 
political influence for the firm via their “connections, access, and clout” (Luechinger and 
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Moser 2014).  Indeed, Pfeffer’s (1972) theory of resource dependence suggests that firms are 
dependent on linkages with the government, such as those provided by politically connected 
directors. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that firms with political insiders on the 
board receive preferential access to government contracts (Goldman et al. 2013), are more 
likely to receive government funding (Duchin and Sosyura 2012), and experience better 
market performance (Agrawal and Knoeber 2001; Goldman et al. 2009) than firms without 
politically connected directors.  
Kim and Zhang (2016) examine the association between political connections and tax 
avoidance. The authors find that the presence of politically connected directors is associated 
with higher levels of tax avoidance. This result suggests that there are returns to appointing a 
politically connected individual to the board of directors. Although Kim and Zhang (2016) 
focus on the existence of political connections, it is likely that the influence of a politically 
connected director depends on the characteristics of the politically connected director. I 
extend Kim and Zhang (2016) and explore instances where the influence of politically 
connected directors on tax avoidance is likely to vary. 
First, I examine whether high-profile political directors influence the level of a firm’s 
tax avoidance.1 Political directors who held high-profile positions in government, including 
president, vice-president, cabinet secretary, senator, congressman, or governor, have stronger 
government connections relative to other politically connected directors. Consequently, high-
profile directors are more likely to advocate successfully for firm’ tax benefits, suggesting 
that the presence of a high-profile director is associated with higher levels of tax avoidance. 
However, high-profile directors are likely also more sensitive to actions that would harm 
their individual reputations. In addition, because they are more visible, these directors are 
                                                          
1 I use “politically connected director” and “political director” interchangeably throughout this paper. 
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more likely to be subject to additional public scrutiny and greater litigation risk associated 
with corporate tax avoidance. Thus, firms with high-profile politically connected directors 
potentially exhibit lower levels of tax avoidance, compared to firms without high-profile 
directors. Consequently, it is not clear whether firms with high-profile directors will exhibit 
higher or lower levels of tax avoidance relative to firms with low-profile political directors.  
Second, I examine whether the politically connected director’s affiliation to the 
political party in power impacts firms’ tax avoidance. Politically connected directors likely 
have more access to, and better relationships with, politicians when they belong to the same 
political party. Therefore, I expect politically connected directors have a greater influence on 
tax avoidance when they are a member of the political party in power in a given year. 
Finally, I examine whether the length of a director’s political service influences the 
association between politically connected directors and firms’ level of tax avoidance. 
Political directors with longer government service likely have more expertise, knowledge, 
social networks, and influence to affect tax policy outcomes for the firm. Longer government 
tenure may facilitate stronger social networks with current government officials and access to 
inside information regarding tax law and enforcement changes. Thus, it is reasonable to 
expect that the association between politically connected directors and tax avoidance is 
stronger for politically connected directors with longer public service.  
To test my hypotheses, I use a sample that is the intersection of the Compustat and 
BoardEx databases. I hand-collect background information on corporate directors to classify 
politically connected directors. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) note that tax avoidance is a 
continuum that ranges from clearly legal transactions, such as investments in municipal 
bonds, to transactions of questionable legality, such as tax shelters. Because I am interested 
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in the influence of the characteristics of politically connected directors across the entire tax 
avoidance continuum, I use a wide variety of tax avoidance proxies. Specifically, I proxy for 
less risky tax avoidance using the effective tax rate and the cash effective tax rate. To proxy 
for aggressive tax avoidance strategies, I estimate discretionary permanent book-tax 
differences, tax shelter prediction scores, and industry- and size-adjusted effective tax rate. 
I find evidence of a relation between firms with high-profile directors and aggressive 
tax avoidance relative to firms with low-profile directors. Also, I find an association between 
a political director’s party affiliation to the political party in power and aggressive tax 
avoidance, but the level of tax aggressiveness varies with affiliation to the branch of 
government in power. Lastly, I find that the length of a political director’s government tenure 
is associated with aggressive tax strategies. I also explore additional cross-sectional analysis 
and sensitivity tests to complement the main analysis. 
My study contributes to two distinct streams of literature. First, I contribute to the 
literature on the determinants of tax avoidance. While there is a long line of research that 
documents substantial variation in firms’ ability to avoid income taxes (Dyreng et al. 2008), 
few examine the characteristics of board members that influence firms’ tax outcomes (e.g. 
Armstrong et al. 2015; Robinson et al. 2012). I contribute to our understanding of the 
variation in tax avoidance across firms by providing evidence on the characteristics of 
politically connected directors associated with firms’ tax avoidance. Second, I contribute to 
research on the outcomes of political connections. Recent research reports that corporate 
political activity, including lobbying, contributing to PACs, or having a former government 
official on the board, is associated with higher levels of tax avoidance (e.g., Kim and Zhang 
2016; Brown et al. 2015; Alexander et al. 2009). I extend this line of research by providing 
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evidence on the mechanisms by which politically connected directors influence tax 
avoidance. My findings suggest that there are returns to political connections, but there is 
variation in the extent of the benefit that some politically connected directors provide.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I review related 
literature and develop hypothesis. Sections III and IV describe the research design, and 
sample selection and results, respectively. Section V provides additional analysis, and 
Section VI concludes. 
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II. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
 
PRIOR LITERATURE ON TAX AVOIDANCE 
 Recent research suggests that firms are highly effective at reducing their tax 
payments. For example, Dyreng et al. (2008) find that approximately one-fourth of firms 
sustain cash effective tax rates below 20 percent over extended periods, as long as 10 years.  
Several studies examine the relation between firm-level characteristics and tax avoidance, yet 
limited empirical studies exist about cross-sectional determinants of corporate tax avoidance. 
Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) and Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) both call for more studies 
that explain cross-sectional differences in corporate tax avoidance. Recent studies examine 
the role individual characteristics of boards of directors play in firms’ tax avoidance 
activities. I discuss both below.2 
 Firm-level characteristics such as the scale of international operations (Rego 2003), 
tax shelter participation (Wilson 2009; Lisowsky 2010), and ownership structure (McGuire, 
Wang, and Wilson 2014; Chen, Parsely, and Yang 2010)3 have been examined as 
determinants of tax avoidance. Robinson, Sikes, and Weaver (2010) examine the association 
between effective tax rates (ETRs) and a firm’s decision to evaluate the performance of tax 
departments as profit centers (i.e., a “contributor to its bottom line”) or cost centers. They 
find that when the tax department is considered a profit center, GAAP ETRs are lower, but 
cash ETRs are not.  
                                                          
2 Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) provide a comprehensive review of the tax avoidance literature. 
3 Chen et al. (2010) examine whether family firms avoid more taxes, while McGuire et al. (2014) examine 
whether agency conflicts, inherent in dual class ownership structure, are associated with the level of firms’ tax 
avoidance, and provide evidence that agency costs play a role in explaining cross-sectional variation in tax 
avoidance. 
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Other studies examine the effects of manager incentives on tax avoidance. For 
example, Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker (2012) examine tax director incentives, and find 
that tax directors are provided with incentives to reduce the tax expense reported on the 
financial statements, but not cash taxes paid. Gallemore, Maydew, and Thornock (2014) 
examine reputational effects of tax sheltering on firms’ CEO and CFO.4 They find that firms’ 
managers do not face labor market consequences following the revelation of tax shelter 
participation. On the other hand, Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff (2014) use survey 
data of top executives and examine whether reputational concerns influence firms’ tax 
planning strategies. The authors find evidence of an association between reputation concerns 
and higher cash ETRs, and lower likelihood of tax shelter participation. The inconsistencies 
between both studies suggest uncertainty about whether reputation concern is a factor in 
firms’ tax strategy decisions.5 
THE EFFECTS OF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS ON FIRMS’ TAX AVOIDANCE 
ACTIVITIES 
 Recent research examines characteristics of individual board members and tax 
avoidance. For example, Armstrong, Blouin, Jagolinzer, and Larcker (2015), and Robinson, 
Xue, and Zhang (2012) find that boards with financial experts influence firms’ tax avoidance 
activities. However, the level of tax avoidance firms undertake varies with the financial 
sophistication of the board (Armstrong et al. 2015). Specifically, more financially 
sophisticated boards moderate relatively extreme levels of tax avoidance. In addition, Brown 
(2011) examines the use of corporate-owned life insurance (COLI) shelters, a particularly 
                                                          
4 Gallemore et al. (2014) define reputation “as a general perception of the firm by all interested stakeholders.” 
5 The authors attempt to reconcile their results to those of other studies that examine reputational consequences 
for firms that engage in tax shelters. They state that “whether reputation concerns constrain tax planning is not 
measurable in archival tests of tax shelter firms because strategies that firms do not employ because of 
reputational concerns are not observed.” 
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aggressive tax strategy, and finds that network ties via board interlocks increase the 
likelihood that a firm adopts the COLI shelter.  This result suggests that board members with 
ties to other boards jointly impact those firms’ tax avoidance behaviors. 
CORPORATE POLITICAL CONNECTIONS 
 The role of government in business is broad in scope. The federal government 
regulates businesses, buys business’ products and services, and promotes, subsidizes, and 
finances business (Steiner and Steiner 2012). Mills, Nutter, and Schwab (2013) provide 
evidence that suggests the government uses its contracting power to elicit certain business 
behaviors and actions. Specifically, their findings suggest that politically-sensitive firms (i.e., 
firms dependent on government contract revenue) exhibit lower levels of tax avoidance.  
Corporations often attempt to influence the political process to obtain economic 
benefits. Lobbying and contributing to political action committees (PACs) are two common 
mechanisms firms use to gain political influence. Prior studies show, in general, that firms 
are rewarded financially and receive preferential treatment from the government from 
engaging in these political activities (Kim 2008; Chen, Parsley, and Yang 2010; Duchin and 
Sosyura 2012; Hill, Kelly, Lockhart, and Ness 2013; Borisov, Goldman, and Gupta 2016)6. 
Political influence is also associated with tax avoidance. Recent studies find that firms that 
lobby and contribute to PACs have lower ETRs (Kim and Zhang 2016; Brown, Drake, and 
Wellman 2015; Alexander, Mazza, and Scholz 2009; Richter, Samphantharak, and Timmons 
2009). The evidence jointly suggests that firms with political connections via lobbying and 
PAC activities achieve favorable economic outcomes. 
Although lobbying and PACs provide firms with similar outcomes, they are limited in 
their source of political influence. These mechanisms of political influence are considered 
                                                          
6 Kim (2008) finds this association only with firms that lobby, and not those that contribute to PACs. 
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complementary activities in the sense that PACs only buy access to legislators’ doors to 
make firms more eligible for lobbying (Kim 2008). Yet, politicians have limited time to meet 
with lobbyists (Kim 2008), and lobbyists’ access to politicians is limited to specific issues 
with specific politicians. Indeed, lobbyists who were former staff members of U.S. senators 
experience a significant drop in lobbying revenues when the senator leaves office (Vidal, 
Draca, and Fons-Rosen 2012).  
Moreover, foreign companies primarily seek the same top lobbying firms to influence 
U.S. policy that are employed by their domestic U.S. competitors because they have a direct 
stake in the U.S.’ business law and tax policy.7 Furthermore, lobbying has been subject to 
federal ethics rules since 1989 following  passage of the Ethics Reform Act, and more 
recently with the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (HLOGA).8 
HLOGA reins in lobbying by members of Congress, their top staffers, and other key 
government officials, and limits their ability to “cash in” immediately on their insider 
knowledge by lobbying their former colleagues.9 Consequently, lobbyists’ ability to provide 
firms with relatively consistent political outcomes is limited. 
                                                          
7 Foreign corporations primarily lobby for international trade, defense, and taxation and the Internal Revenue 
Code. For example, U.K. based GlaxoSmithKline, the second highest spending foreign company on lobbying 
activities, consistently lobbies on Medicare and Medicaid reform issues. In the defense industry, sixteen foreign 
companies that paid U.S. lobbyists to lobby the Department of Defense (between 1998 and mid-2004) received 
more than $16.4 billion in Pentagon contracts, “Foreign companies pay to influence U.S. policy,” Center for 
Public Integrity, May 20, 2005. 
8 The HLOGA was signed into law by President Bush in 2007 in response to lobbying scandals that landed two 
former lawmakers in prison, “Bush signs lobby-ethics bill” The Washington Times (2007); “All cooled off: as 
Congress convenes, former colleagues will soon be calling from K Street” opensecrets.org (2015). 
9 Former government officials are prohibited from lobbying for a specific time period after leaving political 
office. Former senators and high-ranking executive branch officials must wait two years before lobbying 
Congress and former House members must wait one year. The law also includes increased civil and criminal 
penalties for failure to comply. 
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An alternative mechanism for firms to develop political connections is to appoint 
former government officials to their boards of directors.10 Unlike lobbying, a board 
directorship allows former government officials an opportunity to influence sitting law-
makers without registering as lobbyists. Further, there is no obligation to follow strict 
lobbying disclosure requirements or mandated “cooling-off” periods. Political directors can 
“cash out” immediately on their political connections and credentials, and enjoy high paying 
jobs after their political careers are over (Palmer and Schneer 2016).11, 12 
Former government officials’ post-political experience, connections, and influence 
facilitate significant contributions to the board to pre-empt or promote policy outcomes for 
the firm, which may arise using both direct and indirect channels (Goldman et al. 2009). For 
example, political directors may influence allocation of government contracts (Goldman, 
Rocholl, and So 2013), and monitor changes in the regulatory environment.13 Moreover, they 
provide direct access to political decision-makers that enables influence over political 
decisions,14 and enhance firms’ public profile and legitimacy.15 Also, political directors may 
                                                          
10 Boards are a common destination for former politicians. Palmer and Schneer (2016) examine board 
directorships for former senators and governors and report that approximately 50% of former politicians join 
boards compared to only 25% who go on to work as lobbyists.  
11 Political directors earn an average annual salary that exceeds $250,000 for part-time work, for approximately 
only 250 – 300 hours of work annually (about 15% of the hours worked by a full-time employee in a 40 hour 
per week job). 
12 Under federal conflict of interest law, 18 U.S.Code Section 207, senior federal employees in the executive and 
legislative branches are subject to “cooling off” periods. During the period, former senior officials are 
prohibited from communications with intent to influence persons in their former departments or agencies. 
Senators and senior officials in the executive branch are barred within two years of leaving office, and members 
of the House of Representatives are barred for one year after leaving office, www.justice.gov. Nonetheless, I 
contend that the rules set forth in this law are less restrictive than existing laws for lobbying activities. 
Moreover, the conflict of interest law does not prohibit a former government official from serving as a member 
of the board of directors upon termination from political employment. 
13 “Without monitoring [by political directors], businesses may be unaware of potential legislation which may 
affect their operations” (Bierman, Hillman, and Zardkoohi 1999). 
14 Time Warner Cable stated in its 2014 annual report that “Net neutrality regulation or legislation…could result 
in increased taxes and fees imposed on [the company].” The company announced the appointment of former 
senator John Sununu to the board in its 2012 prospectus, which states, in part, that “Senator Sununu has 
significant legislative, regulatory and financial experience. The Company’s business is subject to extensive 
regulation, and [he] provides legislative and regulatory insight.”  
11 
influence legislators to impose tariffs on competitors, and promote a product or business and 
discourage others through the use of tax incentives. Consistent with this line of thought, Kim 
and Zhang (2016) examine whether the presence of politically connected directors is 
associated with corporate tax avoidance. They find that politically connected firms are more 
tax aggressive than non-connected firms, suggesting that politically connected directors 
provide better information regarding tax law and enforcement changes for firms to engage in 
aggressive tax planning strategies. 
In summary, the evidence suggests that appointing a politically connected individual 
to the board is a more effective operational and financial strategy for firms to obtain a variety 
of potentially consistent economic benefits. Recent research finds that the characteristics of 
individual board members, such as financial expertise, (Armstrong et al. 2015; Robinson et 
al. 2012) and political connections (Kim and Zhang 2016) are associated with firms’ tax 
avoidance activities. I extend this line of research by providing evidence on whether 
individual attributes of politically connected directors influence firms’ tax avoidance 
activities. 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
High-Profile Directors 
High-profile political directors served in positions of great influence while in 
government, including president, vice-president, cabinet secretary, senator, congressman, or 
governor, and potentially have stronger government connections relative to other directors. 
Consequently, high-profile directors are more likely to advocate successfully for firms’ tax 
15 Corporations sometimes put high-profile former politicians on the board because it increases “[the firm’s] 
visibility and exposure through the fame, reputation, and status associated with [them] on the board.” 
International Business Times, “Apple and Al Gore: Why are celebrities put on corporate boards?” September 
26, 2011. “Corporate governance experts say [high-profile directors] can be highly beneficial, raising a 
company’s profile and even its stock price” Baltimore Sun (2013). 
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benefits, suggesting that the presence of a high-profile director is associated with higher 
levels of tax avoidance. Indeed, recent evidence suggests that top executives do not face 
reputational costs from the revelation of the firm participating in tax sheltering (Gallemore et 
al. 2014). The authors do not examine why this is the case.16 One possibility is the presence 
of high-profile directors on the board. High-profile directors may exploit their political 
network connections and participate in higher levels of tax avoidance without threat of 
reputational harm to themselves or firm executives relative to directors who did not serve in 
high-profile political positions (i.e., low-profile directors). 
On the other hand, high-profile directors are likely more sensitive to actions that 
would harm their individual reputations. These directors have more name recognition than 
low-profile directors, and are potentially subject to additional public scrutiny and litigation 
risk associated with corporate tax avoidance. Moreover, high-profile directors are more 
visible to the public on both a national and international stage, as they interacted with a broad 
range of constituents and interests while in government, compared to other politicians who 
served in less visible positions. 
Also, anecdotal evidence suggests that high-profile political directors considering re-
election or re-appointment to public office likely face higher reputational costs associated 
with their service in a board directorship. For example, Dick Chaney, before his tenure as a 
U.S. vice-president, served as CEO of Halliburton. During his tenure at Halliburton, Mr. 
Chaney was publicly criticized by members of Congress and the media for engaging in 
                                                          
16 Gallemore et al. (2014) use a one-year window for a matched control sample to examine turnover of CEO and 
CFO positions for firms that revealed participating in tax sheltering. They find no evidence that revealed tax 
shelter firms experience significantly higher likelihood of executive turnover. However, the authors state that 
the effect may indeed exist, but the tests used may not be empirically sufficient to find it. Nonetheless, the 
authors suggest one possibility why executives do not face turnover is that the legal proceedings for a tax shelter 
extend beyond the one-year window they examine. In subsequent tests, they use a three-year window and find 
similar results, i.e. executives do not experience labor market consequences from the revelation of the firm 
engaging in tax sheltering. 
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aggressive tax strategies,  including increasing the number of subsidiaries located in offshore 
tax havens from 9 to 44, and relocating company headquarters from Texas to Dubai, a no-tax 
jurisdiction, to avoid paying the company’s “fair share” of U.S. tax.17, 18 Accordingly, it is 
reasonable to expect that because high-profile directors potentially sustain higher reputational 
risk, they should be more inclined to protect their reputation, and discourage tax avoidance 
when the costs exceed the benefits. Thus, firms with high-profile directors potentially exhibit 
lower levels of tax avoidance, compared to firms without high-profile directors.   
Given the discussion above, it is not clear whether firms with high-profile directors 
exhibit higher or lower levels of tax avoidance relative to firms with low-profile directors. 
Therefore, I do not make a directional hypothesis. Stated formally: 
H1: There is no difference between the level of tax avoidance for firms with a high-
profile director and firms with a low-profile director. 
Political Party Affiliation 
 Politically connected directors who belong to the political party in power likely have 
more access to, and better relationships with, party affiliate politicians to significantly 
influence legislation for the firm’s benefit. Consistent with this notion, Goldman et al. (2009) 
show that board members with connections to the political party in power receive greater 
stock returns, which suggests that a political director’s political party affiliation influences 
firms’ economic outcomes.19 Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that firms whose politically 
                                                          
17 http://www.corpwatch.org. 
18 Also, Jeb Bush, a former governor of the state of Florida, served on several boards of firms that collapsed in 
fraud and bankruptcy, including InnoVida Holdings in which Bush was mandated to repay almost 60% 
($270,000) of his board compensation. A businessman who contracted with the company stated that “…if you 
are running for the president of the United States of America, you need to show that you have [good] 
judgement.” Business Insider, “Jeb Bush’s corporate past is being shredded by experts”, May 28, 2015. 
19 Goldman et al. (2009) examine this association using industry-adjusted returns around the 2000 presidential 
election. They find that firms that contribute to a political party do not perform differently from their industry, 
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connected director is affiliated with the political party in power exhibit higher levels of tax 
avoidance compared to firms whose political director is not affiliated with the political party 
in power. Stated formally: 
H2: The association between political connections and tax avoidance is stronger for 
firms whose politically connected directors are affiliated with the political party in 
power compared to firms whose politically connected directors are not affiliated with 
the political party in power. 
Political Experience 
 The depth of a political director’s human and social capital depends on the quality of 
the “director’s expertise, knowledge, skills, and social networks…one way to gauge the 
depth of a director’s human and social capital is through tenure in government service” 
(Cannella et al. 2008). However, research on the effect of a political director’s tenure on firm 
outcomes is limited. Nonetheless, previous work may provide some guidance and establishes 
an association between the length of an employee’s experience and selection, retention, and 
promotion decisions (e.g., McEnrue 1988; Mills 1956). An assumption of this work is that 
those with the greatest experience and most influential network of relationships will be more 
valuable to their employing firms. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that political 
directors with longer government service likely have stronger social networks with current 
government officials and access to better information regarding tax law and enforcement 
changes. Indeed, “as tenure in government increases, so will the depth of the [political 
director’s] human and social capital,” including expertise, knowledge, skill, social networks, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
but firms with a Republican (Democrat) political director on the board outperform (underperform) their 
industry. 
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resources, and influence (Cannella et al. 2008). Thus, I expect that political directors with 
longer government tenure are associated with higher levels of tax avoidance. Stated formally: 
H3: The association between political connections and tax avoidance is stronger for 
firms whose politically connected directors have lengthy government tenure. 
16 
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
MEASURES OF POLITICAL CONNECTEDNESS 
 I follow Goldman et al. (2009) and define a board member as being politically 
connected if at any time the individual held any of the following positions: president of the 
United States, presidential (vice-presidential) candidate, senator, member of the House of 
Representatives, (assistant) secretary, deputy secretary, deputy assistant secretary, 
undersecretary, associate director, governor, director (CIA, FEMA), deputy director (CIA, 
OMB), commissioner (IRS, NRC, SSA, CRC, FDA, SEC), representative of the United 
Nations, ambassador, mayor, staff (White House, president, presidential campaign), 
chairman of the Party Caucus, chairman or staff of the presidential election campaign, and 
chairman or member of the president’s committee/council.20, 21 BoardEx provides a brief 
description of each board member’s career history. I review each board member’s career 
background and retain directors who are politically connected. I create an indicator variable 
(PCD) that equals one if a firm-year observation has at least one board member who is 
politically connected, and zero otherwise.  
CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS 
To examine the association between politically connected directors and tax 
avoidance, I identify several cross-sectional differences among political directors. 
 
 
                                                          
20 Kim and Zhang (2016) also use Goldman et al.’s (2009) classification of political directors. 
21 I follow Kim and Zhang (2016) and exclude local and lower-ranked politicians. While the authors do not 
describe those positions, I exclude politicians who held positions in cities, municipalities and towns, former 
mayors, and administrative staff because politicians who held these positions are likely less influential. 
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High-Profile Directors 
 Politically connected directors once held elected and/or appointed positions during 
their former political careers. However, variation in political profile likely exists within the 
pool of politically connected directors. High-profile political directors are those who are 
highly visible to the public, interact with a broad range of constituents, and have more name 
recognition than the average board member. I classify a director as high-profile if the 
individual held any of the following government positions during the sample period: 
president, vice-president, cabinet secretary, senator, congressman, or governor. I create an 
indicator variable, HIGH_PROFILE, that is equal to one if a politically connected director 
served as president, vice-president, cabinet secretary, senator, congressman, or governor, and 
zero otherwise.  HIGH_PROFILE captures the average difference between firm-years with a 
high-profile director and firm-years without a high-profile director. A more rigorous 
empirical test controls for firm-years without a high-profile director. Accordingly, I construct 
variable, LOW_PROFILE, which is equal to one for firm-years without a high-profile 
political director, and zero otherwise. Then, I conduct a joint test of significance of the 
coefficients on HIGH-PROFILE and LOW-PROFILE.   
An underlying assumption of the analysis discussed above is that directors who serve 
in any high-profile position share similar reputational risk or network connections to the 
government. Therefore, I perform additional cross-sectional analyses to further investigate 
the effect of high-profile political directors on tax avoidance. I examine whether political 
directors who served in more than one high-profile position influence firms’ tax avoidance 
activities. HIGHPROFILE_MORE is equal to one if a politically connected director served in 
more than one high-profile position, and zero otherwise. I also examine each high-profile 
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position and create indicator variables for each position.22 Specifically, CAB_SEC is equal to 
one if a politically connected director served as a member of the president’s cabinet, and zero 
otherwise. SENATOR is equal to one if a political director served as a U.S. senator, and zero 
otherwise. REP is equal to one if a politically connected director served as a member of the 
U.S. House of Representatives, and zero otherwise. Lastly, GOV takes a value of one if a 
politically connected director served as a state governor, and zero otherwise.   
Political Party Affiliation 
My second hypothesis investigates whether alignment between politically connected 
directors’ party affiliation and the overall political environment matter for tax avoidance. 
Specifically, a shift from Republican (Democrat) to Democrat (Republican) leadership likely 
diminishes a political director’s channels of communication, and, consequently, her political 
influence to impact tax policy in the firm’s favor if the political director’s party affiliate is 
Republican (Democrat). 
Because it is possible for both political parties to each control a branch of government 
simultaneously, I consider three different scenarios.23 I create three indicator variables to 
examine this relationship. First, AFFILIATE_1 is equal to one if the politically connected 
director’s last party affiliation before leaving political office controls either the House, 
Senate, or White House in firm-year t, and zero otherwise. Second, AFFILIATE_2 is equal to 
one if the politically connected director’s last party affiliation before leaving political office 
controls both the House and Senate in firm-year t, and zero otherwise. Finally, AFFILIATE_3 
is equal to one if the politically connected director’s last party affiliation before leaving 
                                                          
22 I do not examine president or vice-president positions because the sample size is relatively small, which 
provides little variation for empirical analysis. Specifically, the descriptive statistics show that combined, both 
positions account for only 0.04% of total firm-years and 0.2% of politically connected firm years.  
23 I define “branch of government” to include the Senate, House, or White House. 
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political office controls the House, Senate, and White House in firm-year t, and zero 
otherwise. 
I also construct additional variables, which capture firm-years not classified in each 
of the three scenarios. Specifically, NO_AFFILIATE_1 is equal to one for firm-years with no 
party alignment to the political party that controls the house, senate, or white house, and zero 
otherwise. NO_AFFILIATE_2 is equal to one for firm-years with no party alignment to the 
political party that controls the house and senate, and zero otherwise. Lastly, 
NO_AFFILIATE_3 is equal to one for firm-years with no party alignment to the political 
party that controls all three branches in firm-year t, and zero otherwise. 
I perform additional cross-sectional analysis to investigate other instances where a 
political director’s party affiliation to the branch of government in power likely influences 
firms’ tax avoidance. For example, it is possible that a political director’s party affiliation to 
a particular branch of government in power has a stronger effect on firm’s tax avoidance 
activities. So, I examine whether a political director’s affiliation with the political party that 
controls Congress (AFFILIATE_CONGRESS) or the white house (AFFILIATE_WHOUSE) 
has a stronger effect on tax avoidance.24 AFFILIATE_CONGRESS is equal to one if a 
politically connected director’s political party affiliate controls the senate or the house, and 
zero otherwise. AFFILIATE_WHOUSE is equal to one if a politically connected director’s 
political party affiliate controls the white house, and zero otherwise.  
 
 
                                                          
24 The same political party controlled both the senate and house for any given year during the sample period. 
Specifically, the Republican Party controlled both branches of government from 1999 to 2007 and 2011 to 
2014. The Democrat Party controlled both branches from 2008 to 2010. Thus, I group firm-years for both 
branches (AFFILIATE_CONGRESS). 
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Political Experience 
 Cannella et al. (2008) state that one way to measure the “depth of [political directors’] 
human and social capital is through tenure in government service.” Accordingly, I use the 
number of years a political director spent in government service (LN_GOVT_TENURE) to 
measure the director’s political experience. Specifically, LN_GOVT_TENURE is the natural 
log of the sum of years a politically connected director served in government. 
MEASURES OF TAX AVOIDANCE 
 Prior studies investigate tax avoidance as a continuum that ranges from less 
aggressive actions, including municipal bond investments (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010), to 
more aggressive measures, including tax shelters (Lisowsky 2010). Kim and Zhang (2016) 
report that firms with politically connected directors are more tax aggressive, and have lower 
effective tax rates. I follow their study and use five existing measures of tax avoidance: 
discretionary permanent book-tax differences, tax shelter prediction scores, industry- and 
size-matched GAAP effective tax rate, GAAP effective tax rate, and cash effective tax rate. 25  
Discretionary permanent book-tax differences (DTAX) (Frank et al. 2009) captures 
permanent differences, which reduce cash taxes paid without decreasing financial statement 
income. DTAX is designed to capture more aggressive tax avoidance activities. Indeed, Frank 
et al. (2009) find that DTAX is associated with the likelihood that a firm is currently engaged 
in a tax shelter. Corporate tax shelters have become important corporate instruments for 
reducing tax burden. Therefore, I use tax shelter prediction scores (SHELTER) (Wilson 2009) 
as another measure of tax aggressiveness. The third tax aggressiveness measure, industry- 
and size-matched GAAP effective tax rate (TA_ETR), captures cross-sectional variation in 
                                                          
25 Kim and Zhang (2016) do not use less aggressive measures of tax avoidance, i.e., GAAP ETR or cash ETR. 
They use measures of more aggressive tax avoidance, i.e., discretionary permanent book-tax differences, tax 
shelter prediction score, and industry- and size-matched GAAP effective tax rate. 
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total tax planning (including timing and permanent differences), and benchmarks a firm’s tax 
aggressiveness relative to that of similar-sized firms in the same industry (Balakrishnan et al. 
2012).26 In the case of each proxy, larger values represent higher levels of tax aggressiveness. 
My first three proxies for tax avoidance capture aggressive tax avoidance. However, 
many benefits available under the tax law are not aggressive. For example, the research and 
development tax credit is not generally considered aggressive. To capture these less 
aggressive activities, I estimate the GAAP effective tax rate, (ETR), and the cash effective 
tax rate, (CETR). Following Dyreng et al. (2008), I define ETR as total tax expense divided 
by pre-tax book income less special items. I define CETR as total cash taxes paid divided by 
pre-tax book income less special items (Dyreng et al. 2008). For each proxy, lower values 
indicate higher levels of tax avoidance. 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Sample Selection Bias and Endogeneity 
 The decision to appoint a politically connected individual to the board is a firm 
choice. To address potential self-selection bias in my sample, I investigate the determinants 
of this choice variable and correct for potential endogeneity and estimate a two-stage 
treatment effects model (Heckman 1979). I first estimate the following reduced probit 
regression model using measures Kim and Zhang (2016) suggest impact the choice to engage 
in the political landscape:27 
Pr(PCD) = α + βXi,t + γ%POL_CONNECTi,t + δINDUSTRYi + θYEARt + ε                      (1) 
                                                          
26 Please see Appendix I for detailed descriptions of DTAX, SHELTER, and TA_ETR. 
27 Kim and Zhang (2016) use a battery of control variables.  I estimate their model in reduced-form and include 
determinants of tax avoidance widely accepted in the literature. However, I also replicate the authors’ findings 
over my extended sample period 1999-2014. The results are provided in Table 7, and the additional variables 
Kim and Zhang (2016) use are described in Appendix II. 
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where all variables are defined in Appendix I. The dependent variable (PCD) is an indicator 
variable equal to one if year t has at least one board member who is politically connected (as 
previously defined), and zero if year t does not have a board member who is politically 
connected.28 Vector Xi,t represents a set of control variables, which are discussed below. I 
include these variables because the same factors that influence tax avoidance also likely 
influence the decision to appoint a politically connected director. 
Lennox, Francis, and Wang (2012) note that the Heckman (1979) model requires that 
the selection (i.e., first-stage model) includes at least one variable that is correlated with the 
decision to appoint a politically connected director, but is not correlated with a firm’s tax 
avoidance activities. The challenge is to identify firm characteristics that are significantly 
associated with the decision to appoint a politically connected director, but not tax avoidance. 
To address this, I follow Kim and Zhang (2016) and include the percentage of politically 
connected firms in a firm’s industry group (%POL_CONNECT) as an additional variable in 
the selection model because %POL_CONNECT likely influences the firm’s decision to 
appoint a politically connected director, but does not necessarily influence the level of a 
firm’s tax avoidance. I use the coefficients from Equation (1) to construct an inverse Mills 
ratio (INVMILLS), which I include as a control variable in Equation (2) (Heckman 1979). 
Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009). 
Multivariate Models29 
Main Effect 
 To examine whether the presence of a politically connected director is associated with 
a firm’s tax avoidance activities, I estimate the following second-stage model: 
                                                          
28 Kim and Zhang (2016) use three political connection indicators: political director, PAC contributions, and 
lobbying expenditures. Because I am interested in the cross-sectional variation in tax avoidance for political 
directors, I replicate their study only for political directors.  
29 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year for all model specifications (Peterson 2009). 
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TAXAVOIDi,t = β0 + β1PCDi  + γCONTROLSi,t + φINVMILLSi,t + δINDUSTRYi 
              + θYEARt + εi,t                                                                              (2) 
where all variables are defined in Appendix I. The dependent variable (TAXAVOID) 
represents one of my five measures of tax avoidance, i.e., DTAX, SHELTER, TA_ETR, ETR, 
and CETR. My variable of interest is PCD. A positive (negative) coefficient on DTAX, 
SHELTER, TA_ETR, (ETR, and CETR) is consistent with the notion that the presence of 
political directors on a board is associated with higher levels of tax avoidance. Likewise, a 
negative (positive) coefficient on DTAX, SHELTER, TA_ETR, (ETR, and CETR) suggests 
that the presence of political directors on a board is associated with lower levels of tax 
avoidance. 
Characteristics of Political Directors 
High-Profile Directors 
To examine the association between tax avoidance and high-profile directors, I 
estimate the following second-stage regression model: 
TAXAVOIDi,t = α0 + β1 HIGH_PROFILEi,t  + β2 LOW_PROFILEi,t  + γCONTROLSi,t   
                           + φINVMILLSi,t + δINDUSTRYi + θYEARt + εi,t                           (3) 
where all variables are defined in Appendix I. The dependent variable (TAXAVOID) 
represents one of my five measures of tax avoidance.  
To test my first hypothesis, I analyze the coefficient on HIGH_PROFILE. A negative 
coefficient when DTAX, SHELTER, and TA_ETR are the dependent variables, and a positive 
coefficient when ETR or CETR serves as the dependent variable supports the position that 
high-profile directors are associated with lower levels of tax avoidance. In contrast, a positive 
coefficient when DTAX, SHELTER, and TA_ETR are the dependent variables, and a negative 
coefficient when ETR or CETR is the dependent variable suggest that high-profile directors 
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are associated with higher levels of tax avoidance. I then test whether the coefficients on 
HIGH_PROFILE and LOW_PROFILE are statistically different. The null hypothesis predicts 
no difference between both coefficients, i.e., (β1 = β2).  
Political Party Affiliation 
I examine the association between tax avoidance and politically connected directors’ 
political party affiliation and estimate the following second-stage regression model: 
TAXAVOIDi,t = α0 + β1 AFFILIATEi,t  + β2 NO_AFFILIATEi,t  + γCONTROLSi,t  
   + φINVMILLSi,t  + δINDUSTRYi + θYEARt + εi,t                (4) 
where all variables are defined in Appendix I. To test my second hypothesis, I analyze the 
coefficient on AFFILIATE. As previously discussed, I consider three different scenarios, 
where AFFILIATE and NO_AFFILIATE represent one of three variables described in 
Appendix I. Therefore, Equation (4) is estimated separately for each of the three 
classifications. Specifically, the first regression includes AFFILIATE_1 and 
NO_AFFILIATE_1, the second regression includes AFFILIATE_2 and NO_AFFILIATE_2, 
and the third regression includes AFFILIATE_3 and NO_AFFILIATE_3. 
A positive coefficient when DTAX, SHELTER, and TA_ETR are the dependent 
variables, and a negative coefficient when ETR or CETR is the dependent variable supports 
the notion that politically connected directors affiliated with the party in power are associated 
with higher levels of tax avoidance. On the other hand, a negative coefficient when DTAX, 
SHELTER, and TA_ETR are the dependent variables, and a positive coefficient when ETR or 
CETR is the dependent variable suggest that politically connected directors affiliated with the 
party in power are associated with lower levels of tax avoidance. I then test my hypothesis, 
i.e., (β1 ≠ β2).  
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Political Experience 
For my final analysis, I examine the association between tax avoidance and politically 
connected directors’ government tenure, and estimate the following second-stage regression 
model: 
TAXAVOIDi,t = α0 + β1 PCDi,t  + β2 GOVT_TENUREi,t  + β3 PCD x GOVT_TENURE  
     + γCONTROLSi,t + φINVMILLSi,t  + δINDUSTRYi + θYEARt + εi,t         (5) 
 where all variables are defined in Appendix I. The coefficient of interest is β3. A positive 
association between PCD*GOVT_TENURE and DTAX, SHELTER, and TA_ETR, and a 
negative association between ETR o CETR suggest that political directors with lengthy 
government service are associated with higher levels of tax avoidance. On the other hand, a 
negative association between PCD*GOVT_TENURE and DTAX, SHELTER, and TA_ETR, 
and a positive association between PCD*GOVT_TENURE and ETR or CETR suggest that 
political directors with lengthy government service are associated with lower levels of tax 
avoidance. 
Control Variables 
In addition to the variables of interest, I control for factors that prior research suggests 
are associated with tax avoidance to examine whether the characteristics of politically 
connected directors are incrementally associated with tax avoidance. I control for firm size 
(SIZE) because larger firms are more visible to the public and potentially face greater 
scrutiny by the government (Zimmerman 1983).  Leverage (LEV) controls for the tax shield 
of debt (Armstrong et al. (2015). Rego (2003) finds that multinational firms with more 
foreign operations have lower worldwide GAAP effective tax rates. Therefore, I include 
foreign assets (FASSETS), which controls for differences in international planning 
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opportunities. In addition, the need for tax avoidance varies with firm profitability in both the 
current year and prior years (Chen et al. 2010). Consequently, I control for firm profitability 
(ROA), and net operating loss carryforwards (NOL and ΔNOL). I also control for firms’ 
growth opportunities (MTB) because rapidly growing firms potentially invest more in tax-
favored assets that generate timing differences in recognition of expenses (Chen et al. 2010).  
More complex firms have greater opportunities to engage in additional tax planning 
(Rego 2003). Accordingly, I include ΔGDWL, GEO_SEG, and CASH, which measure firms’ 
change in goodwill, the number of geographic segments, and the level of a firm’s cash 
holdings, respectively, to control for firm complexity. I include equity income (EQINC), new 
investments (NEW_INVEST), property, plant, and equipment (PP&E), and intangible assets 
(INTANG) to control for differences in book and tax reporting that can affect the tax 
avoidance measures (Chen et al. 2010). I also control for industry competition (HHI) because 
Kubick et al. (2015) find that industry competitors influence firms’ tax avoidance activities. 
Recent research suggests that institutional investors influence firms’ tax avoidance activities 
(Bird and Karolyi 2016). Therefore, I control for institutional ownership (PCT_IO). As 
previously discussed, INVMILLS is derived from Equation (1) and controls for selection bias 
due to unobservable characteristics. Lastly, I control for industry (INDUSTRY) and year 
(YEAR) fixed effects. 
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IV. SAMPLE AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
 
SAMPLE FIRMS 
I obtain director-company data from the BoardEx database and accounting measures 
from the Compustat database. BoardEx collects and organizes data on corporate personnel, 
including their full employment history, and maintains a comprehensive record of 
directorships for firms traded on public exchanges in the United States.30 I review each board 
member’s career background to determine which directors are politically connected and then 
classify politically connected directors based upon their individual characteristics.31 BoardEx 
does not provide all data required for the characteristics I examine.  Specifically, political 
party affiliation of the politically connected director is not available in BoardEx. I obtain data 
for a politically connected director’s political party affiliation from publicly available data 
sources, including www.senate.gov, www.house.gov, and www.bioguide.congress.gov. For 
those political directors who did not hold elected office, I obtain political party affiliation 
from biographies listed on their personal websites.32 
I utilize a sample of firms from 1999-2014 as the beginning of this period reflects the 
initial data availability from the BoardEx database. By necessity, I eliminate firms missing 
director data in BoardEx. Following Kim and Zhang (2016), I delete observations missing 
Compustat data needed to calculate the tax and control variables. I also exclude firm-years 
with negative book values, and total assets less than one million dollars. Lastly, I eliminate 
                                                          
30 http://corp.boardex.com. 
31 Prior studies that examine political directors obtain director data from different sources. BoardEx database is 
widely used in academic research, including the political connections literature (e.g., Palmer and Schneer 2016). 
Kim and Zhang (2016) use the EDGAR database and manually obtain the name and background of each board 
member from SEC filings, including DEF 14a, 10-K, and 8-K. However, I do not believe that differences in 
director data sources should affect inferences drawn from my study. 
32 Data on political party affiliation for appointed former government officials are limited because not all 
appointed government officials disclose their party affiliation. 
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firms that operate in financial services and utilities industries (SIC 4900 – 4999 and 6000 – 
6999) because firms in these industries have different financial reporting considerations.  I 
then merge the BoardEx data with the Compustat data to construct a comprehensive dataset 
of directors and annual firm accounting measures. Data restrictions described above yield a 
final sample of 37,146 total firm-year observations.  
Because my primary analyses use firm-year level observations, some politically 
connected firms do not have a politically connected director in all years during the sample 
period. Accordingly, of the 37,146 total firm-years, 5,914 have a politically connected 
director in year t, i.e., politically-connected firm-years, and 31,232 firm-years do not have a 
politically connected director in year t, i.e., non-politically connected firm-years.  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1, Panel A provides the descriptive statistics for the sample of politically 
connected and non-politically firm-years. I find that the means and medians of my tax 
avoidance measures are generally consistent with prior literature (e.g. Armstrong et al. 2015; 
McGuire et al. 2014; Armstrong et al. 2012; Dyreng et al. 2008).  Specifically, the mean 
(median) TA_ETR is -0.002 (-0.011). The mean (median) ETR is 0.295 (0.326), and the mean 
(median) CETR is 0.239 (0.226).33 The means (medians) for DTAX and SHELTER are -0.005 
(0.002), and 0.233 (0.134), respectively. Also, approximately sixteen percent of sample firm-
years, on average, have a politically connected director (PCD = 0.159).34 Politically 
connected directors represent, on average, approximately two percent of the board (mean 
                                                          
33 I follow prior studies and winsorize ETR and CETR to be between zero and one. 
34 Kim and Zhang (2016) report that approximately 13.5% of their sample firm-years have a politically 
connected director. However, my sample period includes five additional years of data. Therefore, it is 
reasonable that my sample has a higher percentage of politically connected firm-years. 
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PCT_PCD = 0.020), and the average board size (BOARD_TOTAL) is approximately eight 
board members, which is consistent with prior research (e.g. Duellman et al. 2013). 
 Examining some of the political director characteristics show that high profile 
directors account for approximately six percent of total firm-years (HIGH_PROFILE = 
0.062), about two percent of political directors held former government roles as a cabinet 
secretary or senator (CAB_SEC = 0.024; SENATOR = 0.020), approximately three percent 
are former House representatives (REP = 0.032), and about one percent are former governors 
(GOV = 0.012). On average, eight percent of political directors are affiliated with either 
branch of government in power (AFFILIATE_1 = 0.084), and approximately one percent of 
politically connected directors have tax expertise (TAX_EXPERT = 0.012). Lastly, directors 
serve, on average, approximately 10 years on the board (BOARD_TENURE = 9.765). 
Panel B provides industry distributions for politically connected and non-politically 
connected firm-years. Column (1) reports industry distributions for the full sample of firm-
years, and Column (2) reports industry distributions for politically connected firm-years. 
Column (3) reports the distribution of politically connected firm-years relative to total firm-
years in each respective industry, and Column (4) reports the proportion of politically 
connected firm-years in each respective industry to total politically connected firm-years. 
Column (3) shows that the aircraft, candy and soda, defense, nonmetallic mining, personal 
services, precious metals, printing and publishing, and shipbuilding and railroad equipment 
industries comprise approximately 35% to 50% of politically connected firm-years. Column 
(4) shows that within politically connected firm-years, the highest concentration is in the 
business services sector with approximately 16% of firm-years.  
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Collectively, industry distribution percentages in columns (3) and (4) seem to suggest 
an absence of industry concentration, which further suggests that the appointment of a 
politically connected individual to the board may not be industry-related.35 Nonetheless, it is 
still important to consider empirically whether a concentration of politically connected 
directors exist in certain industries. Therefore, I control for industry-related effects in all 
regression models to mitigate misleading interpretations. The univariate correlations are 
presented in Panel C with Pearson (Spearman) coefficients reported above (below) the 
diagonal. I find a negative association between PCD and tax avoidance proxies DTAX and 
CETR, and a positive relationship between PCD and SHELTER, TA_ETR, and ETR.36 Also, 
the correlation coefficients between SHELTER and all three director characteristics are 
positive and significant. Moreover, the correlations between the tax avoidance measures and 
control variables are consistent with prior research. 
Univariate Results 
 Table 2 reports univariate analysis comparing politically connected to non-politically 
connected firm-years. Results show the means for all control variables are statistically 
different between both groups.37 For example, the mean ROA for politically (non-politically) 
connected firm-years is 0.009 (-0.010) (p-value < 0.01). The mean SIZE for politically (non-
politically) connected firm-years is 6.895 (5.650) (p-value < 0.01). Also, mean MTB for 
politically (non-politically) connected firm-years is 3.550 (3.398) (p-value < 0.05). Politically 
(non-politically) connected firm-years have cash on hand (CASH) equal to approximately  
                                                          
35 This finding is consistent with Goldman et al. (2009), who show that companies with politically connected 
boards are relatively evenly distributed across the Fama-French industry groups. 
36 The Pearson coefficient between ETR and PCD is positive, while the Spearman coefficient is negative. 
37 Kim and Zhang (2016) also report statistically different means between connected firm-years and non-
connected firm-years for most control variables in their study. The only exception is control variable NOL. 
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Panel C: Correlation Matrix
Pearson (Spearman) coefficients are above (below) the diagonal.
Bold coefficients are significant at p  < 0.10.
Variables are defined in the Appendix.
PCD PCD_Total High_Profile Affiliate_1 Affiliate_2 Affiliate_3 Tax_Expert Govt_Tenure DTAX Shelter TA_ETR ETR CETR ROA NOL
PCD 0.949 0.589 0.694 0.550 0.447 0.253 0.885 -0.008 0.095 0.003 0.015 -0.005 0.025 -0.016
PCD_Total 0.997 0.621 0.673 0.551 0.449 0.271 0.895 -0.005 0.111 0.002 0.015 -0.003 0.031 -0.023
High_Profile 0.608 0.622 0.579 0.613 0.514 0.386 0.673 0.006 0.066 0.008 0.019 -0.007 0.039 -0.014
Affiliate_1 0.681 0.682 0.588 0.792 0.643 0.232 0.668 -0.006 0.090 0.003 0.012 0.005 0.026 -0.005
Affiliate_2 0.557 0.562 0.613 0.818 0.812 0.237 0.564 -0.004 0.067 0.010 0.006 -0.001 0.025 -0.004
Affiliate_3 0.461 0.466 0.536 0.677 0.827 0.207 0.463 -0.004 0.054 0.005 0.005 -0.005 0.020 -0.004
Tax_Expert 0.248 0.254 0.361 0.237 0.234 0.201 0.292 -0.002 0.019 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.006 -0.003
Govt_Tenure 0.941 0.945 0.658 0.669 0.564 0.470 0.270 -0.002 0.112 -0.001 0.016 0.000 0.034 -0.023
DTAX -0.008 -0.009 -0.015 -0.010 -0.007 -0.018 -0.006 -0.008 0.217 0.190 -0.403 -0.186 0.446 0.030
Shelter 0.128 0.132 0.074 0.111 0.088 0.072 0.029 0.127 0.087 0.078 -0.122 -0.098 0.280 0.163
TA_ETR 0.019 0.020 0.017 0.012 0.019 0.011 0.003 0.013 0.191 0.118 -0.423 -0.206 0.005 0.046
ETR -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.018 -0.020 -0.009 -0.005 -0.005 -0.412 -0.244 -0.443 0.336 0.107 -0.117
CETR -0.013 -0.013 -0.021 -0.002 -0.007 -0.011 -0.003 -0.009 -0.152 -0.085 -0.242 0.311 0.011 -0.131
ROA -0.037 -0.038 -0.041 -0.032 -0.026 -0.020 -0.038 -0.034 -0.020 0.241 -0.039 0.192 0.095 -0.144
NOL 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.016 0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 0.055 0.221 0.064 -0.156 -0.156 -0.147
%FAssets 0.042 0.045 0.020 0.046 0.035 0.026 0.001 0.044 0.111 0.603 0.121 -0.313 -0.039 -0.020 0.214
Size 0.241 0.246 0.144 0.179 0.143 0.120 0.065 0.248 -0.053 0.636 0.052 -0.119 -0.024 0.163 0.142
Lev 0.124 0.125 0.107 0.106 0.092 0.071 0.040 0.129 -0.022 -0.052 -0.023 -0.010 -0.064 -0.280 0.101
MTB 0.040 0.042 0.001 0.008 0.010 0.018 -0.007 0.045 -0.003 0.298 0.040 -0.047 -0.041 0.503 -0.003
PCT_IO 0.048 0.049 0.021 0.040 0.038 0.030 0.001 0.057 -0.016 0.272 -0.005 -0.102 -0.077 -0.010 0.175
ΔNOL 0.022 0.022 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.005 0.005 0.022 0.067 0.160 -0.037 -0.002 0.069 -0.063 0.045
EqInc 0.062 0.064 0.051 0.039 0.046 0.035 0.023 0.067 -0.069 0.115 0.034 -0.052 -0.008 -0.010 0.032
HHI 0.009 0.009 0.023 0.029 0.011 0.009 0.017 0.012 -0.114 -0.163 -0.010 0.124 0.079 -0.057 -0.049
Geo_Seg 0.048 0.050 0.032 0.049 0.036 0.030 -0.003 0.049 0.088 0.550 0.098 -0.265 -0.027 -0.028 0.196
Cash -0.075 -0.075 -0.070 -0.053 -0.045 -0.025 -0.032 -0.074 0.064 0.199 0.103 -0.126 -0.054 0.274 0.029
ΔGDWL 0.052 0.051 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.014 0.004 0.048 0.015 0.196 0.002 -0.066 0.015 0.020 0.127
New_Invest -0.019 -0.018 -0.022 -0.015 -0.016 -0.022 -0.007 -0.018 0.068 0.209 0.069 -0.113 -0.122 0.211 0.056
PP&E 0.024 0.025 0.067 0.021 0.033 0.025 0.006 0.026 -0.076 -0.114 -0.022 0.080 -0.023 0.025 -0.117
Intang 0.089 0.089 0.024 0.052 0.036 0.027 0.023 0.085 0.071 0.180 -0.043 -0.085 -0.005 -0.099 0.183
%Pol_Connect 0.227 0.230 0.164 0.097 0.116 0.115 0.057 0.225 -0.021 -0.138 0.010 0.127 -0.032 0.025 -0.153
TABLE 1 (continued)
34 
 
 
%FAssets Size Lev MTB PCT_IO ΔNOL EqInc HHI Geo_Seg Cash ΔGDWL New_Invest PP&E Intang %Pol_Connect
PCD 0.029 0.223 0.099 0.013 0.075 -0.011 0.040 0.020 0.040 -0.054 0.026 -0.030 0.035 0.030 0.218
PCD_Total 0.037 0.240 0.098 0.017 0.078 -0.010 0.048 0.023 0.046 -0.059 0.028 -0.031 0.037 0.030 0.218
High_Profile 0.022 0.143 0.090 -0.005 0.045 -0.009 0.035 0.038 0.028 -0.064 0.011 -0.031 0.074 0.011 0.156
Affiliate_1 0.030 0.167 0.084 0.008 0.057 -0.009 0.034 0.039 0.043 -0.051 0.004 -0.023 0.040 0.023 0.104
Affiliate_2 0.029 0.126 0.069 -0.006 0.057 -0.009 0.039 0.027 0.031 -0.051 -0.001 -0.027 0.039 0.007 0.108
Affiliate_3 0.024 0.104 0.050 -0.002 0.046 -0.008 0.030 0.020 0.026 -0.032 -0.003 -0.027 0.028 0.005 0.104
Tax_Expert 0.001 0.059 0.038 0.002 0.014 -0.008 0.008 0.017 0.002 -0.026 0.011 -0.019 0.014 0.012 0.057
Govt_Tenure 0.032 0.244 0.109 0.013 0.084 -0.009 0.055 0.032 0.041 -0.062 0.026 -0.032 0.046 0.033 0.211
DTAX 0.037 0.021 0.012 -0.059 0.022 0.046 0.004 0.013 0.055 -0.103 -0.001 -0.130 0.015 -0.038 -0.009
Shelter 0.402 0.536 -0.058 0.082 0.273 0.229 0.102 -0.070 0.390 0.068 0.086 0.070 -0.060 0.076 -0.111
TA_ETR 0.036 0.010 -0.009 0.022 -0.019 -0.007 0.034 -0.007 0.026 0.099 0.012 0.056 0.001 -0.042 -0.002
ETR -0.129 0.009 0.022 -0.049 -0.027 -0.019 -0.008 0.079 -0.100 -0.119 -0.002 -0.068 0.051 0.014 0.075
CETR -0.011 -0.031 -0.061 -0.068 -0.062 -0.006 -0.015 0.058 -0.009 -0.086 -0.013 -0.078 -0.072 -0.010 -0.007
ROA 0.115 0.322 0.062 -0.201 0.194 -0.184 0.113 0.136 0.208 -0.356 0.022 -0.355 0.131 -0.072 -0.027
NOL 0.109 0.022 0.043 0.035 0.103 0.098 -0.026 -0.071 0.093 0.049 0.024 0.050 -0.097 0.041 -0.138
%FAssets 0.277 -0.036 -0.019 0.203 -0.022 0.053 -0.126 0.687 0.023 0.033 0.006 -0.097 0.026 -0.130
Size 0.319 0.191 0.157 0.456 -0.042 0.114 0.080 0.285 -0.033 0.081 0.015 0.133 0.102 -0.004
Lev -0.032 0.224 0.061 0.114 -0.025 0.053 0.143 -0.015 -0.310 0.099 -0.037 0.338 0.094 0.095
MTB 0.119 0.465 -0.057 0.000 0.091 -0.028 -0.070 -0.068 0.252 -0.002 0.244 -0.049 -0.015 0.024
PCT_IO 0.197 0.323 0.094 0.118 -0.036 0.053 -0.029 0.220 -0.035 0.046 0.009 0.011 0.049 -0.077
ΔNOL 0.038 0.069 0.067 -0.018 0.005 -0.014 -0.035 -0.045 0.110 0.014 0.122 -0.017 0.041 -0.008
EqInc 0.078 0.163 0.130 -0.003 0.067 0.024 0.053 0.067 -0.088 -0.001 -0.049 0.068 -0.005 0.034
HHI -0.257 0.017 0.133 -0.076 -0.073 0.017 0.031 -0.097 -0.197 -0.025 -0.179 0.240 -0.035 0.073
Geo_Seg 0.855 0.285 -0.014 0.092 0.189 0.029 0.085 -0.216 -0.099 0.015 -0.092 -0.107 0.019 -0.131
Cash 0.200 -0.002 -0.534 0.236 0.038 -0.055 -0.104 -0.185 0.149 -0.008 0.432 -0.218 0.028 0.015
ΔGDWL 0.167 0.235 0.144 0.083 0.163 0.077 0.045 -0.072 0.154 -0.071 0.322 0.001 0.399 0.029
New_Invest 0.163 0.153 -0.054 0.226 0.142 0.024 -0.028 -0.192 0.136 0.163 0.342 0.087 0.130 0.026
PP&E -0.176 0.085 0.313 -0.024 -0.055 0.051 0.090 0.221 -0.152 -0.322 -0.135 0.061 -0.049 0.155
Intang 0.166 0.261 0.280 0.058 0.196 0.035 0.022 -0.087 0.154 -0.184 0.562 0.109 -0.308 0.005
%Pol_Connect -0.152 -0.056 0.081 0.004 -0.077 0.017 0.062 0.047 -0.132 -0.093 -0.044 -0.030 0.158 -0.048
TABLE 1, Panel C (continued)
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23% (28%) of total assets (p-value < 0.01). Further, politically connected and non-politically 
connected firm-years have, on average, eight board members (BOARD_TOTAL = 7.991 and 
7.739, respectively; p-value < 0.01), and approximately one politically connected director 
serves on a board (PCD_TOTAL = 1.322). Political directors serve approximately 17 years in 
their former political careers (GOVT_TENURE = 17.168), and both politically connected 
directors and non-politically connected directors serve 10 years, on average, in their board 
directorships (BOARD_TENURE = 10.012 and 9.718, respectively; p-value < 0.05).  
 Lastly, difference in means for the five tax proxies suggest there is variation in the 
type of tax avoidance politically connected directors influence. Specifically, politically (non-
politically) connected firm-years have mean DTAX of -0.007 (-0.004), mean TA_ETR equals 
-0.001      (-0.002), and mean CETR equals 0.237 (0.239), (p-values > 0.10). On the other 
hand, mean SHELTER for politically (non-politically) connected firm-years is 0.285 (0.223) 
(p-value < 0.01), and mean ETR for politically (non-politically) connected firm-years is 
0.300 (0.294) (p-value < 0.05). 
 Overall, the univariate results show no differences in some tax proxies and significant 
differences in other firm characteristics. Inferences from univariate results are difficult to 
assess when such large differences exist, and so are explored more thoroughly using 
multivariate tests in the next section. At the least, the univariate results highlight the 
importance of addressing these differences in the research design, and why they should be 
included as control variables. 
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Main Results 
Results from Selection Model 
Before I examine the relationship between politically connected director 
characteristics and tax avoidance, I first establish whether the mere presence of political 
directors is associated with firms’ tax avoidance activities.38 Accordingly, I estimate the 
selection model, Equation (1), and present the results in Table 3, Panel A. The area under the 
ROC curve is 0.75. The area under the ROC curve is a reflection of how well a model 
discriminates between groups with and without treatment. A range of 0.70 to 0.80 is 
interpreted as a “fair” test (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2002). Thus, a ROC curve value of 0.75 
suggests that my selection model has acceptable discriminatory power in distinguishing 
between firms that appoint a politically connected individual to the board and firms that do 
not appoint a politically connected individual to the board.  
With regard to the determinants, I find that less profitable firms (ROA) (coef. = -
0.148; z = -1.64), and firms with fewer growth opportunities (MTB) (coef. = -0.027; z = -
5.91) exhibit a higher likelihood of appointing a politically connected individual to the board. 
Additionally, firm size (SIZE) (coef. = 0.212; z = 16.32), debt levels (LEV) (coef. = 0.618; z 
= 5.74), and the percentage of politically connected firms in a firm’s industry group 
(%POL_CONNECT) (coef. = 3.115; z = 8.50) are important determinants of the likelihood of 
appointing politically connected individuals to the board. I use the coefficient estimates from 
Equation (1) to construct an inverse Mills ratio (INVMILLS), which I include as a control 
variable in Equation (2). 
 
 
                                                          
38 I also report the findings from the replication of Kim and Zhang (2016) below. 
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Multivariate Results 
Panel B presents the results from estimating Equation (2), which measures the level 
of tax avoidance firms undertake in politically connected firm-years relative to non-
politically connected firm-years. I estimate five measures of tax avoidance to capture various 
tax avoidance strategies firms may engage in. DTAX (column 1), SHELTER (column 2), and 
TA_ETR (column 3) capture more aggressive tax avoidance strategies, while ETR (column 
4), and CETR (column 5) capture less aggressive tax avoidance strategies. I find a positive 
and significant association between PCD and DTAX (coef. = 0.042; t = 2.95), and SHELTER 
(coef. = 0.078; t = 2.86), which suggests that firms with political directors on the board 
engage in aggressive tax avoidance strategies. I do not find an association between PCD and 
TA_ETR.39 I also find no significant relation between PCD and ETR and CETR. Thus, the 
overall findings suggest that the presence of politically connected directors is associated with 
aggressive tax strategies, which is “probably due to the mitigating effect of political 
connections on the cost of aggressive and complicated tax strategies” (Kim and Zhang 2016), 
relative to less aggressive tax strategies. 
The coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with prior research 
(e.g. Kim and Zhang 2016; Brown et al. 2015). For example, ROA, NOL, %FASSETS, and 
CASH are positively and significantly associated with most tax avoidance measures (p-values 
< 0.01). Also politically connected firms that engage in  more aggressive tax avoidance 
activities have higher market-to-book ratios (p-value < 0.01), and firms that engage in less 
aggressive tax avoidance activities have lower market-to-book ratios (p-value < 0.01). The 
coefficients on other control variables are somewhat inconsistent across the tax avoidance 
                                                          
39 I also use an alternative research design, quantile regression, which allows me to examine the relationship 
between political directors and tax avoidance across different parts of the tax avoidance distribution. The results 
are reported in Section V. 
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proxies. For example, firm size (SIZE) is negatively related to DTAX, and positively 
associated with SHELTER, TA_ETR, but are consistent with the findings in Kim and Zhang 
(2016). 
Characteristics of Politically Connected Directors 
High-Profile Directors 
 Table 4 reports the results from estimating Equation (3), which examines the 
association between tax avoidance and high-profile directors. The variable of interest is 
HIGH_PROFILE. I find a positive and significant association between HIGH_PROFILE and 
some of the tax avoidance measures. Specifically, I find that high-profile directors are 
associated with aggressive tax avoidance when DTAX (coef. = 0.043; t = 3.20), and 
SHELTER (coef. = 0.085; t = 3.10) are the dependent variables, controlling for the presence 
of LOW_PROFILE directors and firm characteristics. I do not find a significant relation 
between HIGH_PROFILE and TA_ETR, ETR, and CETR.  
Interestingly, the results also show that LOW_PROFILE directors are also associated 
with aggressive tax avoidance. Therefore, I test whether the difference between the 
coefficients on HIGH_PROFILE and LOW_PROFILE are statistically different for each tax 
proxy. I find a significant difference between the coefficients when SHELTER is the 
dependent variable (p-value < 0.10). Accordingly, I reject the null hypothesis (β1 = β2), and 
accept the alternative that political directors who are high-profile are associated with higher 
levels of aggressive tax avoidance, compared to directors who are low-profile, when 
SHELTER serves as my proxy for tax avoidance.  This result suggests that high-profile 
directors likely have stronger government connections, which provides political cover to 
engage in greater risk-taking tax strategies. 
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Political Party Affiliation 
Table 5 reports the results from estimating Equation (4), which examines the 
association between tax avoidance and politically connected directors’ political party 
affiliation with the party in power. I examine three different scenarios: 1) affiliation with the 
party in power that controls the senate, house, or white house; 2) affiliation with the party in 
power that controls the senate and house; and 3) affiliation with the party in power that 
controls the senate, house, and white house. Panel A reports the results for the relation 
between tax avoidance and political directors’ party affiliation to the political party that 
controls either the senate, house, or white house. I find a positive and significant relation 
between AFFILIATE_1 and DTAX (coef. = 0.045; t = 3.10), and SHELTER (coef. = 0.090; t 
= 3.29), controlling for non-affiliate firm-years (NO_AFFILIATE_1) and firm characteristics. 
I do not find a significant relation between AFFILIATE_1 and TA_ETR, ETR, and CETR.  
Also, the coefficients on NO_AFFILIATE_1 are significant when DTAX and 
SHELTER are the dependent variables (p-values < 0.01), which suggest that a political 
director’s affiliation to the political party that controls either branch of government is 
potentially trivial for firms’ tax avoidance strategies. Therefore, I test whether the difference 
between the coefficients on AFFILIATE_1 and NO_AFFILIATE_1 are statistically different 
for each tax avoidance measure. I find a statistical difference when SHELTER is the tax 
avoidance measure (p-value < 0.01), and no significant difference between coefficients for 
the other tax avoidance measures (p-values > 0.10). Nonetheless, this result provides some 
support for my hypothesis, i.e. political directors affiliated with the political party in power 
for either branch of government are associated with higher levels of tax aggressiveness. 
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Panel B reports the results for the association between tax avoidance and political 
directors’ party affiliation with the political party that controls both the senate and house. I 
find a positive and significant relation between AFFILIATE_2 and DTAX (coef. = 0.041; t = 
3.04), and SHELTER (coef. = 0.088; t = 3.18), controlling for non-affiliate firm-years 
(NO_AFFILIATE_2) and firm characteristics. I do not find a statistical relation when the 
other tax avoidance measures serve as my proxies for tax avoidance. Moreover, the results 
show the coefficients on NO_AFFILIATE_2 are also significant and positive when DTAX and 
SHELTER are the tax avoidance measures. Therefore, I test whether the coefficients between 
AFFILIATE_2 and NO_AFFILIATE_2 are statistically different, i.e., (β1 ≠ β2). I find that 
firms with political directors affiliated with the political party that controls the senate and 
house are associated with higher levels of aggressive tax avoidance (p-value < 0.05), which 
supports H2. 
Panel C presents the results for the association between tax avoidance and political 
directors’ party affiliation with the political party that controls the senate, house, and white 
house. I find a significant and positive relationship between AFFILIATE_3 and DTAX (coef. 
= 0.038; t = 2.71), and SHELTER (coef. = 0.087; t = 3.15), controlling for non-affiliate firm-
years (NO_AFFILIATE_3) and firm characteristics. This finding suggests that political 
connections through party affiliation with all three branches of government influence firms’ 
tax avoidance behavior. However, I also find similar results for control variable, 
NO_AFFILIATE_3. Accordingly, I test whether the coefficients between AFFILIATE_3 are 
NO_AFFILIATE_3 are statistically different. I find that political directors affiliated with the 
political party that controls all three branches of government are more tax aggressive, when 
SHELTER serves as my proxy for tax avoidance (p-value < 0.10), which supports H2. I also 
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find a statistical difference when DTAX is the tax avoidance proxy (p-value < 0.05). 
However, the magnitude of the coefficient on AFFILIATE_3 is smaller than that on 
NO_AFFILIATE_3, which suggests firms with political directors affiliated with the political 
party that controls all three branches of government are less tax aggressive, when DTAX 
serves as my proxy for tax avoidance. Nonetheless, in aggregate the findings suggest that 
firms with political directors affiliated with the party in power that controls one or more 
branch of government engage in aggressive tax avoidance. 
Political Experience 
Lastly, the results for my third characteristic, political experience, are presented in 
Table 6. The coefficient of interest is on the interaction term PCD*GOVT_TENURE, which 
is positive and significant when DTAX (coef. = 0.004; t = 2.19) and SHELTER (coef. = 0.007; 
t = 1.69) serve as my proxies for tax avoidance. The findings support H3, and suggest that 
firms whose political directors have lengthy government service engage in aggressive tax 
avoidance strategies. I do not find a significant relation when the other tax avoidance 
measures serve as my proxies for tax avoidance. Overall, the findings suggest that politically 
connected directors with lengthy government experience potentially use their social capital 
and influential political networks to shield firms from political costs associated with 
engaging in aggressive tax avoidance activities.  
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Panel A: Tax Avoidance and Political Directors' Affiliation with the Political Party that Controls the Senate, House, or White House
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
AFFILIATE_1 ? 0.045*** 0.090*** -0.015 0.017 -0.012
(3.10) (3.29) (-0.68) (0.89) (-0.42)
NO_AFFILIATE_1 ? 0.041*** 0.076*** -0.014 0.017 -0.012
(2.87) (2.76) (-0.64) (0.98) (-0.44)
ROA + 0.323*** 0.223*** -0.071*** 0.283*** 0.062***
(27.04) (15.22) (-3.09) (14.70) (2.53)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.052*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.045***
(10.90) (12.18) (3.07) (-5.87) (-10.52)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.062*** -0.002 -0.002* 0.002
(4.74) (7.28) (-0.49) (-1.85) (0.63)
%FASSETS + 0.008*** 0.087*** 0.006 -0.025*** 0.026***
(2.89) (13.56) (0.84) (-3.64) (3.57)
EQINC ? -1.318*** 2.090*** 1.249*** -0.989* -0.919
(-5.77) (4.63) (2.80) (-1.88) (-1.55)
SIZE ? -0.014*** 0.045*** 0.002 0.002 0.000
(-12.29) (17.03) (1.45) (1.11) (-0.05)
LEV + 0.025*** -0.161*** 0.017 -0.003 -0.073***
(5.86) (-13.13) (1.32) (-0.16) (-4.48)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(4.03) (2.68) (0.17) (-4.82) (-4.00)
HHI ? 0.028** -0.064* 0.069** -0.053 0.070*
(2.23) (-1.71) (1.98) (-1.51) (1.61)
GEO_SEG + -0.005*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.000 0.002
(-2.43) (11.56) (0.30) (0.12) (0.42)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.039*** 0.064*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(2.96) (4.16) (5.93) (-5.59) (-7.87)
ΔGDWL ? -0.016 0.040** 0.036 -0.010 0.038**
(-0.99) (2.11) (1.52) (-0.40) (2.10)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.001 0.086*** 0.067*** -0.060*** -0.029
(0.10) (5.67) (3.74) (-4.75) (-1.40)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.036*** 0.010 -0.007 -0.069***
(-1.48) (-3.34) (0.90) (-0.71) (-4.81)
INTANG ? 0.004** 0.004 -0.044*** 0.019** -0.010
(2.06) (0.93) (-3.38) (1.99) (-1.09)
INVMILLS ? -0.020*** -0.039*** 0.010 -0.012 0.005
(-2.55) (-2.62) (0.73) (-1.21) (0.30)
INTERCEPT ? 0.030*** -0.038*** -0.369*** 0.328*** 0.348***
(5.54) (-2.35) (-27.28) (19.79) (20.63)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.63% 51.99% 2.71% 9.55% 7.99%
Prob > F
affiliate_1 = no_affiliate_1 0.179 0.011 0.824 0.997 0.569
TABLE 5
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
Second-stage: Tax Avoidance and Political Dirctors' Political Party Affiliation
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Panel B: Tax Avoidance and Political Directors' Affiliation with the Political Party that Controls the Senate and House
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
AFFILIATE_2 +/− 0.041*** 0.088*** -0.011 0.017 -0.011
(3.04) (3.18) (-0.47) (0.90) (-0.42)
NO_AFFILIATE_2 +/− 0.042*** 0.074*** -0.017 0.017 -0.012
(2.90) (2.68) (-0.77) (0.98) (-0.44)
ROA + 0.323*** 0.222*** -0.071*** 0.283*** 0.062***
(26.99) (15.18) (-3.11) (14.74) (2.53)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.052*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.045***
(10.88) (12.20) (3.08) (-5.87) (-10.53)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.062*** -0.002 -0.002* 0.002
(4.74) (7.27) (-0.49) (-1.85) (0.63)
%FASSETS + 0.008*** 0.087*** 0.006 -0.025*** 0.026***
(2.88) (13.58) (0.84) (-3.64) (3.56)
EQINC ? -1.316*** 2.091*** 1.244*** -0.989* -0.920
(-5.71) (4.63) (2.78) (-1.88) (-1.55)
SIZE ? -0.014*** 0.045*** 0.002 0.002 -0.000
(-12.19) (17.06) (1.46) (1.11) (-0.05)
LEV + 0.025*** -0.160*** 0.017 -0.003 -0.073***
(5.93) (-13.09) (1.30) (-0.16) (-4.49)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(4.01) (2.66) (0.17) (-4.82) (-4.00)
HHI ? 0.028** -0.064* 0.068** -0.053 0.070*
(2.25) (-1.70) (1.97) (-1.51) (1.61)
GEO_SEG + -0.005*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.000 0.002
(-2.42) (11.57) (0.30) (0.12) (0.42)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.039*** 0.064*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(2.96) (4.17) (5.95) (-5.59) (-7.87)
ΔGDWL ? -0.016 0.040** 0.036 -0.010 0.038**
(-1.00) (2.08) (1.53) (-0.40) (2.10)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.001 0.086*** 0.067*** -0.060*** -0.029
(0.10) (5.66) (3.75) (-4.75) (-1.40)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.036*** 0.010 -0.007 -0.069***
(-1.48) (-3.34) (0.90) (-0.71) (-4.81)
INTANG ? 0.004** 0.004 -0.044*** 0.019** -0.010
(2.06) (0.97) (-3.38) (1.99) (-1.09)
INVMILLS ? -0.020*** -0.037*** 0.010 -0.012 0.005
(-2.50) (-2.43) (0.73) (-1.24) (0.30)
INTERCEPT ? 0.030*** -0.039*** -0.369*** 0.328*** 0.348***
(5.56) (-2.55) (-27.23) (19.88) (20.78)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.63% 51.99% 2.71% 9.55% 7.99%
Prob > F
affiliate_2 = no_affiliate_2 0.751 0.029 0.163 0.984 0.885
TABLE 5 (continued)
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
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Panel C: Tax Avoidance and Political Directors' Affiliation with the Political Party the controls the Senate, House, and White House
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
AFFILIATE_3 ? 0.038*** 0.087*** -0.013 0.020 -0.006
(2.71) (3.15) (-0.57) (1.08) (-0.24)
NO_AFFILIATE_3 ? 0.044*** 0.074*** -0.015 0.015 -0.014
(3.03) (2.69) (-0.70) (0.89) (-0.52)
ROA + 0.323*** 0.222*** -0.071*** 0.283*** 0.062***
(27.01) (15.17) (-3.10) (14.76) (2.52)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.052*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.045***
(10.88) (12.18) (3.08) (-5.86) (-10.51)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.062*** -0.002 -0.002* 0.002
(4.74) (7.27) (-0.49) (-1.85) (0.63)
%FASSETS + 0.008*** 0.087*** 0.006 -0.025*** 0.026***
(2.89) (13.57) (0.84) (-3.65) (3.56)
EQINC ? -1.315*** 2.097*** 1.248*** -0.991* -0.924
(-5.71) (4.65) (2.79) (-1.88) (-1.56)
SIZE ? -0.014*** 0.045*** 0.002 0.002 -0.000
(-12.26) (17.14) (1.46) (1.13) (-0.04)
LEV + 0.025*** -0.160*** 0.017 -0.003 -0.073***
(5.93) (-13.07) (1.31) (-0.16) (-4.50)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(4.02) (2.66) (0.17) (-4.82) (-4.00)
HHI ? 0.029** -0.064* 0.068** -0.054 0.070
(2.27) (-1.69) (1.97) (-1.52) (1.60)
GEO_SEG + -0.005*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.000 0.002
(-2.41) (11.56) (0.30) (0.12) (0.42)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.039*** 0.064*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(2.96) (4.15) (5.94) (-5.58) (-7.87)
ΔGDWL ? -0.016 0.039** 0.036 -0.010 0.038**
(-1.01) (2.07) (1.53) (-0.40) (2.11)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.001 0.086*** 0.067*** -0.060*** -0.029
(0.11) (5.66) (3.74) (-4.75) (-1.40)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.036*** 0.010 -0.007 -0.069***
(-1.49) (-3.33) (0.90) (-0.71) (-4.80)
INTANG ? 0.004** 0.004 -0.044*** 0.019** -0.010
(2.07) (0.95) (-3.38) (1.99) (-1.09)
INVMILLS ? -0.020*** -0.036*** 0.010 -0.012 0.005
(-2.53) (-2.36) (0.73) (-1.22) (0.33)
INTERCEPT ? 0.030*** -0.036** -0.369*** 0.328*** 0.348***
(5.53) (-2.09) (-27.24) (19.83) (20.88)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.64% 51.98% 2.71% 9.55% 8.00%
Prob > F
affiliate_3 = no_affiliate_3 0.042 0.057 0.654 0.447 0.193
TABLE 5 (continued)
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
PCD +/− 0.028 0.055* -0.012 0.017 -0.032
(1.60) (1.84) (-0.42) (0.85) (-1.13)
PCD*GOVT_TENURE ? 0.004** 0.007* -0.001 -0.000 0.006
(2.19) (1.69) (-0.25) (-0.09) (1.60)
ROA + 0.323*** 0.222*** -0.070*** 0.283*** 0.062***
(26.77) (15.16) (-3.09) (14.68) (2.52)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.053*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.045***
(10.91) (12.32) (3.03) (-5.89) (-10.39)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.062*** -0.002 -0.002* 0.002
(4.74) (7.26) (-0.49) (-1.86) (0.61)
%FASSETS + 0.008*** 0.087*** 0.006 -0.025*** 0.026***
(2.86) (13.45) (0.84) (-3.63) (3.56)
EQINC ? -1.328*** 2.074*** 1.250*** -0.984* -0.931
(-5.79) (4.64) (2.80) (-1.87) (-1.57)
SIZE ? -0.014*** 0.045*** 0.002 0.002 0.000
(-12.06) (17.17) (1.43) (1.12) (0.00)
LEV + 0.025*** -0.160*** 0.017 -0.003 -0.073***
(6.07) (-13.10) (1.32) (-0.15) (-4.48)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(4.02) (2.64) (0.17) (-4.84) (-3.99)
HHI ? 0.028** -0.064* 0.069** -0.053 0.069
(2.28) (-1.70) (1.98) (-1.51) (1.58)
GEO_SEG + -0.005*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.000 0.002
(-2.41) (11.59) (0.29) (0.13) (0.42)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.040*** 0.064*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(3.02) (4.19) (5.96) (-5.59) (-7.90)
ΔGDWL ? -0.016 0.039** 0.036 -0.010 0.037**
(-1.03) (2.05) (1.53) (-0.41) (2.07)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.001 0.086*** 0.067*** -0.060*** -0.028
(0.17) (5.69) (3.74) (-4.75) (-1.39)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.036*** 0.010 -0.007 -0.069***
(-1.43) (-3.34) (0.89) (-0.71) (-4.76)
INTANG ? 0.004** 0.004 -0.044*** 0.019** -0.010
(2.06) (0.95) (-3.39) (1.99) (-1.06)
INVMILLS ? -0.017** -0.033** 0.009 -0.012 0.008
(-2.07) (-2.17) (0.65) (-1.20) (0.55)
INTERCEPT ? 0.031*** -0.038** -0.369*** 0.328*** 0.348***
(5.62) (-2.31) (-27.22) (19.73) (20.85)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.63% 51.98% 2.70% 9.54% 8.01%
TABLE 6
Second-stage: Tax Avoidance and Political Directors' Government Experience
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
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Replication of Kim And Zhang (2016) 
         Below I report the results from replicating Kim and Zhang (2016), which examines the 
association between politically connected directors and firms’ tax aggressiveness.40 
Results from Selection Model 
 Table 7, Panel A reports the results from an expanded first-stage estimation of 
Equation (1).41 My findings are mostly consistent with the authors’ findings. First, the area 
under the ROC curve is 0.76, which is consistent with Kim and Zhang (2016). With regard to 
the determinants, profitability (ROA) (coef. = -0.487; z = -5.03), investment activity 
(NEW_INVEST) (coef. = -0.475; z = -4.17), cash holdings (CASH) (coef. = -0.281; z = -4.44),  
and growth opportunities (MTB) (coef. = -0.019; z = -4.32) are negatively and significantly 
associated with the likelihood that a firm appoints a politically connected individual to the 
board of directors. While firm size (SIZE) (coef. = 0.205; z = 15.21), debt (LEV) (coef. = 
0.430; z = 3.77), number of business segments (BUS_SEG) (coef. = 0.077; z = 2.17), and the 
percentage of politically connected firms in a firm’s industry group (%POL_CONNECT) 
(coef. = 2.841; z = 8.17) are positively and significantly associated with the likelihood that a 
firm appoints a politically connected individual to the board. Finally, I use the coefficient 
estimates from the first-stage regression to construct an inverse Mills ratio (INVMILLS), 
which I include as a control variable in the second-stage model. 
Multivariate Results 
 Panel B reports results from estimating an expanded second-stage regression, 
Equation (2), which estimates the relation between politically connected directors and firms’ 
                                                          
40 Kim and Zhang (2016) examine this relationship over the period 1999 – 2009. I replicate their study over my 
sample period, 1999- 2014. I also replicate their study over their period 1999 – 2009, and find similar 
(unreported) results. 
41 As previously noted, Kim and Zhang (2016) use a battery of control variables. The additional variables 
included in the replication models are described in Appendix II. 
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tax avoidance activities. I examine this relationship with three aggressive tax measures: 
DTAX, SHELTER, and TA_ETR. Column (1) reports the results when DTAX is the dependent 
variable, column (2) reports the results when SHELTER serves as the dependent variable, and 
column (3) reports the results when TA_ETR is the dependent variable. Consistent with Kim 
and Zhang (2016), I find that the presence of politically connected directors is positively and 
significantly associated with DTAX (coef. = 0.047; t = 3.73) and SHELTER (coef. = 0.073; t 
= 2.64). However, I find a negative and insignificant association when TA_ETR serves as the 
proxy for aggressive tax avoidance (coef. = -0.019; t = -0.84). While this result is 
inconsistent with Kim and Zhang (2016), it is consistent with other studies. For example, 
Armstrong et al. (2015) examine the relationship between certain board characteristics and 
TA_ETR, and also find a negative and insignificant relationship.42  Overall, the findings on 
the main effect variable (PCD) is mostly consistent with the findings in Kim and Zhang 
(2016), i.e., the presence of politically connected directors is related to higher leves of tax 
aggressiveness. 
 The coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with the authors’ 
findings. For example, firms that are profitable (ROA), report net operating loss 
carryforwards (NOL), report a higher percentage of foreign assets (%FAssets), have more 
cash holdings (CASH), and are larger (SIZE) are more tax aggressive. In aggregate, the 
results in Table 7 are consistent with Kim and Zhang (2016), and establish that political 
connections, facilitated by politically connected directors, is associated with aggressive tax 
avoidance.  
 
                                                          
42 Armstrong et al. (2015) do not find an association between the financial expertise of the board and TA_ETR 
using an OLS regression model. They also use quantile regressions and examine the extreme tails of the tax 
avoidance distribution, and find an association within specified percentiles. 
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Probability of Appointing a Politically Connected Individual to the Board of Directors
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
Coefficents
(z -statistic)
b, c
INTERCEPT ? -2.059***
(-2.73)
ROA ? -0.487***
(-5.03)
STDROA ? -0.112**
(-1.91)
NOL ? -0.002
(-0.04)
ΔNOL ? 0.000
(0.01)
%FASSETS ? -0.026
(-0.37)
ΔGDWL ? 0.192
(0.99)
NEW_INVEST ? -0.475***
(-4.17)
PP&E ? -0.156
(-1.41)
INTANG ? 0.021
(0.33)
EQINC ? 5.135
(1.07)
DACC ? -0.902***
(-3.51)
CASH ? -0.281***
(-4.44)
SIZE + 0.205***
(15.21)
LEV + 0.430***
(3.77)
MTB ? -0.019***
(-4.32)
BUS_SEG + 0.077**
(2.17)
Panel A: Results from Selection Equation
Replication of Kim and Zhang (2016) over Sample Period 1999 - 2014
TABLE 7
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GEO_SEG + -0.001
(-0.17)
PCT_IO ? 0.003
(0.05)
DUAL_CLASS ? -0.079
(-0.77)
HHI + -0.505
(-1.08)
%POL_CONNECT + 2.841***
(8.17)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes
Area Under ROC Curve 0.76   
Observations 32,798
TABLE 7, Panel A (continued)
a
 Variables are defined in the Appendices.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009).
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(1) (2) (3)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
PCD + 0.047*** 0.073*** -0.019
(3.73) (2.64) (-0.84)
ROA + 0.319*** 0.254*** -0.089***
(25.16) (17.19) (-3.40)
STDROA ? 0.021*** 0.004 0.002
(6.55) (1.14) (0.07)
NOL ? 0.025*** 0.053*** 0.012***
(11.38) (12.60) (3.15)
ΔNOL ? 0.014*** 0.062*** -0.001
(4.48) (7.36) (-0.45)
%FASSETS + 0.009*** 0.088*** 0.005
(2.94) (13.27) (0.75)
ΔGDWL ? -0.009 0.018 0.030
(-0.52) (0.88) (1.23)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.006 0.084*** 0.065***
(0.92) (5.61) (3.70)
PP&E ? -0.007* -0.038*** 0.008
(-1.69) (-3.50) (0.76)
INTANG ? 0.003 0.002 -0.042***
(1.07) (0.42) (-3.13)
EQINC ? -1.370*** 1.977*** 1.208***
(-5.17) (4.58) (2.73)
DACC + -0.200*** 0.334*** 0.165***
(-5.29) (9.26) (3.62)
CASH − 0.021*** 0.030*** 0.059***
(4.28) (3.42) (5.90)
SIZE ? -0.014*** 0.048*** 0.004***
(-12.30) (15.65) (2.45)
LEV + 0.030*** -0.149*** 0.015
(5.49) (-12.47) (1.18)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001 0.000
(3.50) (1.38) (0.14)
TABLE 7 (continued)
Associaton between Tax Avoidance and Political Connections for Politically 
Connected Firm-Years relative to Non-Politically Connected Firm-Years
Panel B: Results from Second-stage Equation (2)
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BUS_SEG + 0.002 0.005 0.001
(1.56) (1.42) (0.25)
GEO_SEG + -0.005 0.037*** 0.002
(-2.37) (11.17) (0.57)
PCT_IO ? -0.014*** -0.019*** -0.012***
(-6.22) (-3.00) (-2.77)
DUAL_CLASS − 0.007*** 0.001 -0.003
(2.63) (0.10) (-0.45)
HHI ? 0.016 -0.047 0.072**
(1.29) (-1.23) (2.14)
INVMILLS ? -0.022*** -0.034** 0.012
(-3.22) (-2.21) (0.87)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 32,798 32,798 19,471
R
2
0.274   0.531   0.032   
a
 Variables are defined in the Appendices.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
TABLE 7, Panel B (continued) 
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V. SENSITIVITY TESTS AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS  
 
SENSITIVITY TESTS 
Alternative political director measure 
Any one given politician is unlikely to represent the ties and experience to all levels 
of government. Indeed, politically connected directors represent a different set of contacts 
and type of political experience, which suggests that no one political director is a perfect 
substitute for another. Accordingly, the effect multiple political directors have on firms’ tax 
avoidance activities is unknown – do multiple political directors constrain or encourage 
firms’ tax avoidance activities beyond their mere presence on the board? I investigate this 
question empirically and examine whether the results in Table 3, Panel B are robust to an 
alternative measure of political connections.  I transform the binary variable (PCD) to a 
count variable (LN_PCD_TOTAL), which measures the natural log of the number of 
politically connected directors on the board. Table 8 presents the results from re-estimating 
Equation (2) when LN_PCD_TOTAL serves as the variable of interest. Consistent with the 
results in Table 3, Panel B, I find that the effect of political directors on firms’ tax avoidance 
activities is positive and significant when DTAX and SHELTER serve as my proxies for tax 
avoidance (p-values < 0.01). Moreover, the R2 reported in Table 3, Panel B increases 
marginally for both models, from 26.63% and 51.98% to 26.64% and 52.01%, respectively, 
which suggests that the count measure provides incremental explanatory value beyond the 
binary indicator. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
LN_PCD_TOTAL +/− 0.026*** 0.059*** -0.007 0.007 0.006
(4.65) (4.01) (-0.64) (0.75) (0.31)
ROA + 0.321*** 0.220*** -0.070*** 0.283*** 0.064***
(28.00) (15.74) (-3.07) (14.71) (2.64)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.053*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.045***
(11.07) (12.25) (3.05) (-5.82) (-10.44)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.062*** -0.002 -0.002* 0.002
(4.74) (7.28) (-0.49) (-1.81) (0.63)
%FASSETS + 0.008*** 0.087*** 0.006 -0.025*** 0.027***
(2.80) (13.27) (0.87) (-3.68) (3.62)
EQINC ? -1.313*** 2.096*** 1.245*** -0.983* -0.934
(-5.68) (4.72) (2.79) (-1.86) (-1.56)
SIZE ? -0.013*** 0.046*** 0.002 0.003 -0.001
(-14.93) (19.35) (1.49) (1.40) (-0.58)
LEV + 0.028*** -0.156*** 0.016 -0.001 -0.075***
(6.16) (-13.41) (1.21) (-0.08) (-4.84)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(3.72) (2.61) (0.23) (-4.87) (-3.99)
HHI ? 0.030*** -0.062* 0.068** -0.053 0.068
(2.39) (-1.63) (1.99) (-1.50) (1.59)
GEO_SEG + -0.005*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.001 0.002
(-2.39) (11.61) (0.29) (0.13) (0.41)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.040*** 0.064*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(3.00) (4.22) (5.96) (-5.59) (-7.88)
ΔGDWL ? -0.016 0.038** 0.036 -0.010 0.037**
(-1.02) (2.00) (1.53) (-0.40) (2.08)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.001 0.086*** 0.067*** -0.060*** -0.028
(0.11) (5.74) (3.76) (-4.77) (-1.39)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.036*** 0.010 -0.007 -0.069***
(-1.46) (-3.33) (0.90) (-0.71) (-4.81)
INTANG ? 0.005** 0.005 -0.044*** 0.019** -0.010
(2.08) (0.99) (-3.36) (1.98) (-1.06)
INVMILLS ? -0.008*** -0.019*** 0.005 -0.006 -0.005
(-2.91) (-2.98) (0.77) (-1.37) (-0.53)
INTERCEPT ? 0.029*** -0.037** -0.368*** 0.327*** 0.349***
(5.66) (-2.10) (-28.20) (19.68) (21.79)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.64% 52.01% 2.70% 9.54% 7.99%
TABLE 8
Tax Avoidance and the Number of Politically Connected Directors on the Board
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
Results from Second-stage Equation (2)
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Continuous political director presence 
A more rigorous test is to compare firms with continuous politically connected 
director presence to firms with no politically connected director during the sample period. 
Accordingly, I examine whether my results are robust to an alternative subset of sample 
firms that have continuous political director presence. Table 9 reports the results from re-
estimating Equation (1), for sample firms with continuous politically connected director 
presence on the board relative to sample firms with no politically connected director on the 
board in any sample firm-year. Overall, the results for the covariates are generally consistent 
with those reported in Table 3, Panel A. For example, SIZE (coef. = 0.231; z = 9.77), LEV 
(coef. = 0.834; z = 4.88), and %POL_CONNECT (coef. = 2.343; z = 4.31) are positively and 
significantly associated with the likelihood of appointing a politically connected individual to 
the board. The area under the ROC curve is 0.77, which suggests that the selection model has 
acceptable discriminatory power in distinguishing between firms that appoint a politically 
connected individual and firms that do not appoint a politically connected individual to the 
board.  
Panel B reports the results from re-estimating Equation (2), which are also consistent 
with those previously reported in Table 3, Panel B. Specifically, the coefficient on PCD is 
positive and significant when DTAX (coef. = 0.060; t = 2.65) and SHELTER (coef. = 0.116; t 
= 3.08) are the tax avoidance proxies. I also do not find a significant association between 
PCD and the other tax avoidance measures. Overall, the evidence is consistent with results 
previously reported, i.e., the presence of politically connected directors on board is associated 
with aggressive tax avoidance activities. 
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Probability of Appointing a Politically Connected Individual to the
Board of Directors - continuous political director presence subsample
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
Coefficents
(z -statistic)
b, c
INTERCEPT ? -3.316***
(-9.01)
ROA ? -0.184
(-1.09)
NOL ? 0.028
(0.44)
%FASSETS ? -0.230*
(-1.85)
SIZE + 0.231***
(9.77)
LEV + 0.834***
(4.88)
MTB ? -0.018***
(-2.24)
PCT_IO ? -0.101
(-1.02)
%POL_CONNECT + 2.343***
(4.31)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes
Area Under ROC Curve 0.77   
Firm-Years 28,477
TABLE 9
Panel A: Results from Selection Equation
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009).
Tax Avoidance and Continuous Presence of Politically Connected 
Directors on the Board
  
  
60 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
PCD +/− 0.060*** 0.116*** -0.007 -0.011 -0.059
(2.65) (3.08) (-0.28) (-0.38) (-1.58)
ROA + 0.324*** 0.227*** -0.067*** 0.255*** 0.056**
(25.68) (17.43) (-2.54) (11.92) (1.98)
NOL ? 0.028*** 0.054*** 0.015*** -0.025*** -0.049***
(10.07) (10.61) (3.04) (-6.18) (-10.30)
ΔNOL ? 0.017*** 0.067*** -0.005 -0.002 0.007**
(4.86) (8.60) (-0.64) (-1.53) (2.02)
%FASSETS + 0.008*** 0.089*** -0.006 -0.017** 0.027***
(2.10) (12.00) (-0.65) (-2.13) (3.21)
EQINC ? -1.420*** 1.417*** 1.235** -1.098* -0.854
(-5.19) (2.81) (2.27) (-1.78) (-1.30)
SIZE ? -0.015*** 0.042*** 0.002 0.003 0.001
(-12.62) (16.88) (1.12) (1.30) (0.63)
LEV + 0.021*** -0.148*** 0.016 0.001 -0.071***
(4.19) (-10.91) (0.93) (0.03) (-3.34)
MTB ? 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.004***
(4.62) (3.70) (0.11) (-3.87) (-4.34)
HHI ? 0.021 -0.052 0.082** -0.062 0.080*
(1.43) (-1.26) (1.98) (-1.46) (1.71)
GEO_SEG + -0.005** 0.034*** 0.007* -0.002 0.001
(-2.21) (9.48) (1.73) (-0.51) (0.16)
CASH − 0.017*** 0.043*** 0.069*** -0.074*** -0.079***
(3.77) (4.66) (6.84) (-5.86) (-7.63)
ΔGDWL ? -0.031 0.025 0.031 0.000 0.025
(-1.21) (1.47) (1.04) (0.01) (1.01)
NEW_INVEST ? -0.007 0.084*** 0.073*** -0.062*** -0.030
(-0.70) (5.51) (3.81) (-4.16) (-1.40)
PP&E ? -0.003 -0.032*** 0.006 0.003 -0.063***
(-0.63) (-2.84) (0.51) (0.22) (-3.91)
INTANG ? 0.011 0.011** -0.040*** 0.019* -0.007
(1.46) (2.15) (-2.66) (1.61) (-0.55)
INVMILLS ? -0.027** -0.044*** 0.007 0.003 0.031
(-2.31) (-2.49) (0.48) (0.19) (1.52)
INTERCEPT ? 0.026*** 0.096*** -0.374*** 0.334*** 0.338***
(4.34) (6.05) (-23.14) (18.07) (17.30)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.86% 49.45% 3.27% 9.28% 8.59%
TABLE 9 (continued)
Panel B: Results from Second-stage Equation (2)
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
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Alternative high-profile measure 
Previous analysis examines the effect of high-profile politically connected directors 
on tax avoidance. An underlying assumption from this analysis is that directors who serve in 
any high-profile position share equal reputational risk, or represent similar network 
connections to the government. Yet, politically connected directors who serve in more than 
one high-profile position likely face more reputational risk, which may significantly decrease 
their affect on tax avoidance. On the other hand, political directors who serve in more than 
one high-profile position likely have stronger political connections in government, and 
greater access to important legislators to help shield the firm from political costs associated 
with aggressive tax positions. 
Previously reported results in Table 4 suggest, in part, that high-profile directors are 
associated with aggressive tax strategies. I re-estimate Equation (3) and examine whether the 
results are robust to an alternative measure of high-profile directors, i.e., directors who 
served in more than one high-profile position (HIGHPROFILE_MORE). The results are 
reported in Table 10. I find a positive and significant coefficient on HIGHPROFILE_MORE 
when DTAX (coef. = 0.008; t = 2.17) is the tax avoidance proxy, controlling for the presence 
of low-profile directors (LOW_PROFILE) and firm characteristics. However, I do not find a 
statistical difference between the coefficients on HIGHPROFILE_MORE and 
LOW_PROFILE across the tax avoidance measures (p-values > 0.10). The results suggest 
that political connections, facilitated by directors who served in more than high-profile 
position, have no incremental effect on firms’ tax avoidance. In aggregate, the evidence from 
Tables 4 and 10 suggest that the political profile of a director, rather than the number of high-
profile positions a director served in, influences firm’s tax avoidance activities.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
HIGHPROFILE_MORE ? 0.008** 0.015 -0.008 0.008 0.010
(2.17) (1.20) (-0.86) (0.80) (0.94)
LOW_PROFILE ? 0.002 -0.004 -0.009 -0.003 0.001
(0.50) (-0.42) (-1.42) (-0.44) (0.13)
ROA + 0.320*** 0.215*** -0.070*** 0.282*** 0.064***
(27.92) (15.51) (-3.04) (14.54) (2.57)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.053*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.045***
(11.07) (12.29) (3.05) (-5.82) (-10.45)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.062*** -0.002 -0.002* 0.002
(4.74) (7.26) (-0.49) (-1.81) (0.61)
%FASSETS + 0.008*** 0.086*** 0.006 -0.025*** 0.027***
(2.72) (13.24) (0.86) (-3.67) (3.62)
EQINC ? -1.291*** 2.148*** 1.246*** -0.977* -0.937
(-5.57) (4.70) (2.80) (-1.86) (-1.58)
SIZE ? -0.012*** 0.049*** 0.002 0.003* -0.001
(-16.32) (23.22) (1.58) (1.77) (-0.57)
LEV + 0.030*** -0.151*** 0.016 -0.001 -0.075***
(6.69) (-13.08) (1.22) (-0.05) (-5.04)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(3.53) (2.29) (0.22) (-4.97) (-4.10)
HHI ? 0.032*** -0.053 0.068** -0.052 0.068
(2.62) (-1.41) (1.99) (-1.46) (1.57)
GEO_SEG + -0.005*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.000 0.002
(-2.40) (11.50) (0.28) (0.12) (0.40)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.039*** 0.064*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(2.96) (4.13) (5.97) (-5.61) (-7.86)
ΔGDWL ? -0.016 0.039** 0.036 -0.010 0.037**
(-1.01) (2.06) (1.51) (-0.39) (2.03)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.001 0.085*** 0.067*** -0.060*** -0.028
(0.08) (5.61) (3.77) (-4.80) (-1.39)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.036*** 0.010 -0.008 -0.069***
(-1.44) (-3.36) (0.90) (-0.73) (-4.81)
INTANG ? 0.005** 0.004 -0.044*** 0.019** -0.010
(2.06) (1.00) (-3.33) (1.98) (-1.05)
INVMILLS ? 0.002 0.007 0.005 -0.003 -0.003
(1.10) (1.47) (1.46) (-0.67) (-0.85)
INTERCEPT ? 0.026*** -0.048*** -0.368*** 0.326*** 0.349***
(5.22) (-3.56) (-28.42) (19.69) (22.00)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.58% 51.92% 2.71% 9.55% 7.99%
Prob > F
highprofile_more = low_profile 0.150 0.117 0.947 0.167 0.398
TABLE 10
Second-stage: Tax Avoidance and Political Directors' Service in Multiple High-Profile Positions
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
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Analysis of each high-profile position 
 The main analysis reported in Table 4 examines the association between directors’ 
political profile and tax avoidance. However, the analysis assumes a lack of variation in 
reputational risk, or political connection strength among the various high-profile positions. 
Therefore, I re-estimate Equation (3) for each high-profile position, and conduct a joint test 
of significance between the coefficients on the high-profile positions. The results are reported 
in Table 11. First, I examine the relation between a high-profile director who served as a 
cabinet secretary (CAB_SEC) and firms’ tax avoidance activities. The results are presented in 
Panel A. I find a positive and significant coefficient on CAB_SEC when SHELTER is the 
measure of tax avoidance (p-value < 0.05). Next, I examine the association between political 
directors who served as representatives of the house (REP) and tax avoidance. The findings 
reported in Panel B show a positive and significant coefficient when TA_ETR (coef. = 0.011; 
t = 1.70) is the tax avoidance proxy. Then, I examine whether the political connections of a 
senator (SENATOR) are associated with a firm’s tax avoidance. The results are reported in 
Panel C. I find a positive and significant association between SENATOR and DTAX (p-value 
< 0.01), which suggests that a political director who once served as a U.S. senator is 
associated with aggressive tax avoidance.  
I also find a positive and significant coefficient on SENATOR when ETR serves as the 
tax avoidance proxy (p-value < 0.10), which suggest that political directors who were former 
senators are associated with lower levels of tax avoidance. This finding appears to conflict 
with previously reported results. However, one possible explanation for the inconsistency is 
that former senators likely channel their influence to more complex tax strategies to shield 
the firm from political costs, rather than spend political capital on less aggressive tax 
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strategies. The last high-profile position I examine is state governors (GOV). The estimates 
reported in Panel D provide evidence of a relation between politically connected directors 
who once served as a state governor (GOV) and tax aggressiveness (DTAX) (coef. = 0.011; t 
= 2.60).  
Next, I triangulate the results discussed above to determine whether a particular high-
profile position has a greater effect on firms’ tax avoidance, relative to the other high-profile 
positions. The estimates reported in Panel E provide evidence of a relation between 
TAXAVOID and the various HIGH_PROFILE positions. Specifically, the coefficient on 
SENATOR is 0.007 (t = 1.86) when TAXAVOID is measured with DTAX. However, the joint 
test of significance show that the coefficient is not statistically different from the coefficients 
on the other high-profile positions (p-values > 0.10). In column (2), I find a positive and 
significant association between CAB_SEC and SHELTER (coef. = 0.027; t = 2.34), which is 
statistically more positive than the coefficients on REP (p-value < 0.10), and GOV (p-value < 
0.05). I also find that senators (SENATOR) are associated with higher levels of tax 
aggressiveness relative to governors (GOV) (p-value < 0.10). When TAXAVOID is measured 
with TA_ETR, I find a positive and significant coefficient on REP (coef. = 0.015; t = 2.06), 
which is statistically more positive than the coefficients on CAB_SEC (p-value < 0.10) and 
SENATOR (p-value < 0.05). I do not find a statistical difference between the coefficients on 
the various high-profile positions and less aggressive tax avoidance measures, ETR and 
CETR. Overall, the evidence supports previous findings of a relation between high-profile 
directors and more extreme forms of tax avoidance. However, the evidence also suggests that 
the level of tax aggressiveness varies among the different political profile types.  
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Panel A: Tax Avoidance and Cabinet Secretary Political Profile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CAB_SEC ? 0.006 0.026** -0.002 0.004 0.007
(1.19) (2.24) (-0.28) (0.42) (0.65)
ROA + 0.319*** 0.215*** -0.069*** 0.282*** 0.063***
(28.38) (15.49) (-3.03) (14.66) (2.56)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.053*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.045***
(11.03) (12.22) (3.07) (-5.82) (-10.46)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.062*** -0.002 -0.002* 0.002
(4.74) (7.28) (-0.49) (-1.79) (0.63)
%FASSETS + 0.007*** 0.086*** 0.006 -0.025*** 0.026***
(2.70) (13.15) (0.89) (-3.69) (3.61)
EQINC ? -1.289*** 2.145*** 1.241*** -0.981* -0.935
(-5.53) (4.73) (2.79) (-1.86) (-1.58)
SIZE ? -0.012*** 0.048*** 0.001 0.003* -0.001
(-16.90) (21.90) (1.28) (1.73) (-0.55)
LEV + 0.030*** -0.151*** 0.015 -0.001 -0.075***
(6.63) (-13.21) (1.17) (-0.05) (-5.06)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(3.48) (2.31) (0.26) (-4.94) (-4.12)
HHI ? 0.033*** -0.052 0.067** -0.051 0.069
(2.62) (-1.37) (1.96) (-1.46) (1.59)
GEO_SEG + -0.005*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.000 0.002
(-2.39) (11.52) (0.29) (0.13) (0.41)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.039*** 0.065*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(2.95) (4.12) (5.96) (-5.60) (-7.83)
ΔGDWL ? -0.016 0.039** 0.036 -0.010 0.037**
(-1.00) (2.06) (1.51) (-0.39) (2.05)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.000 0.085*** 0.068*** -0.060*** -0.028
(0.03) (5.63) (3.79) (-4.78) (-1.39)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.036*** 0.010 -0.007 -0.069***
(-1.42) (-3.29) (0.89) (-0.70) (-4.81)
INTANG ? 0.005** 0.005 -0.044*** 0.019** -0.010
(2.06) (1.00) (-3.35) (1.97) (-1.05)
INVMILLS ? 0.003*** 0.004* 0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(2.65) (1.78) (0.67) (-1.58) (-1.01)
INTERCEPT ? 0.026*** -0.050*** -0.367*** 0.326*** 0.349***
(5.20) (-3.66) (-28.66) (19.80) (22.08)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.60% 51.95% 2.70% 9.54% 7.99%
TABLE 11
Tax Avoidance and Political Directors' Political Profile
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
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Panel B: Tax Avoidance and House Representative Political Profile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
REP ? 0.002 0.006 0.011* 0.007 0.004
(0.55) (0.60) (1.70) (0.80) (0.42)
ROA + 0.319*** 0.215*** -0.069*** 0.282*** 0.063***
(28.38) (15.47) (-3.02) (14.69) (2.56)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.053*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.045***
(11.07) (12.26) (3.07) (-5.83) (-10.46)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.062*** -0.002 -0.002* 0.002
(4.74) (7.27) (-0.49) (-1.80) (0.63)
%FASSETS + 0.007*** 0.086*** 0.006 -0.025*** 0.027***
(2.71) (13.18) (0.88) (-3.67) (3.62)
EQINC ? -1.284*** 2.164*** 1.242*** -0.974* -0.927
(-5.49) (4.72) (2.79) (-1.85) (-1.56)
SIZE ? -0.012*** 0.049*** 0.001 0.003* -0.001
(-16.84) (22.21) (1.18) (1.74) (-0.52)
LEV + 0.030*** -0.150*** 0.015 -0.001 -0.075***
(6.66) (-13.19) (1.13) (-0.06) (-5.04)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(3.46) (2.28) (0.29) (-4.94) (-4.12)
HHI ? 0.032*** -0.053 0.066** -0.052 0.069
(2.60) (-1.38) (1.95) (-1.47) (1.58)
GEO_SEG + -0.005*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.001 0.002
(-2.38) (11.53) (0.29) (0.14) (0.41)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.039*** 0.064*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(2.94) (4.11) (5.96) (-5.61) (-7.87)
ΔGDWL ? -0.016 0.039** 0.035 -0.009 0.037**
(-0.99) (2.06) (1.48) (-0.38) (2.06)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.000 0.085*** 0.068*** -0.060*** -0.028
(0.03) (5.62) (3.78) (-4.79) (-1.39)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.036*** 0.010 -0.008 -0.069***
(-1.44) (-3.36) (0.88) (-0.72) (-4.81)
INTANG ? 0.005** 0.004 -0.043*** 0.019** -0.010
(2.06) (0.99) (-3.32) (1.96) (-1.06)
INVMILLS ? 0.003*** 0.006** 0.000 -0.004 -0.002
(3.09) (2.18) (0.04) (-1.61) (-0.89)
INTERCEPT ? 0.026*** -0.046*** -0.367*** 0.327*** 0.349***
(5.21) (-2.98) (-28.51) (19.84) (22.13)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.59% 51.93% 2.72% 9.54% 7.99%
TABLE 11 (continued)
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
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Panel C: Tax Avoidance and Senator Political Profile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
SENATOR ? 0.008*** 0.019 -0.007 0.015* 0.009
(2.71) (1.46) (-0.77) (1.67) (0.76)
ROA + 0.320*** 0.216*** -0.069*** 0.282*** 0.063***
(28.37) (15.52) (-3.05) (14.68) (2.56)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.053*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.045***
(11.08) (12.26) (3.08) (-5.83) (-10.46)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.062*** -0.002 -0.002* 0.002
(4.74) (7.27) (-0.49) (-1.80) (0.64)
%FASSETS + 0.008*** 0.086*** 0.006 -0.025*** 0.027***
(2.74) (13.15) (0.88) (-3.65) (3.63)
EQINC ? -1.292*** 2.145*** 1.244*** -0.989* -0.935
(-5.53) (4.69) (2.80) (-1.88) (-1.58)
SIZE ? -0.012*** 0.049*** 0.001 0.003* -0.001
(-17.01) (22.21) (1.35) (1.69) (-0.55)
LEV + 0.030*** -0.151*** 0.016 -0.001 -0.075***
(6.66) (-13.17) (1.17) (-0.07) (-5.03)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(3.48) (2.31) (0.24) (-4.93) (-4.10)
HHI ? 0.032*** -0.054 0.067** -0.053 0.068
(2.55) (-1.43) (1.99) (-1.52) (1.57)
GEO_SEG + -0.005*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.000 0.002
(-2.40) (11.45) (0.31) (0.10) (0.40)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.039*** 0.065*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(2.95) (4.12) (5.97) (-5.60) (-7.85)
ΔGDWL ? -0.016 0.039** 0.036 -0.010 0.037**
(-0.99) (2.07) (1.51) (-0.39) (2.06)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.000 0.085*** 0.067*** -0.060*** -0.028
(0.04) (5.63) (3.77) (-4.78) (-1.38)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.036*** 0.011 -0.008 -0.069***
(-1.45) (-3.38) (0.90) (-0.73) (-4.82)
INTANG ? 0.005** 0.004 -0.044*** 0.019** -0.010
(2.07) (1.00) (-3.34) (1.96) (-1.06)
INVMILLS ? 0.003*** 0.005** 0.002 -0.004** -0.003
(3.13) (2.07) (0.76) (-1.97) (-1.04)
INTERCEPT ? 0.027*** -0.048*** -0.367*** 0.327*** 0.349***
(5.26) (-3.34) (-28.40) (19.95) (22.19)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.60% 51.94% 2.71% 9.56% 7.99%
TABLE 11 (continued)
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
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Panel D: Tax Avoidance and Governor Political Profile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
GOV ? 0.011*** 0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.004
(2.60) (0.05) (0.01) (0.15) (-0.26)
ROA + 0.319*** 0.215*** -0.069*** 0.282*** 0.063***
(28.30) (15.48) (-3.04) (14.66) (2.55)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.053*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.045***
(11.02) (12.27) (3.06) (-5.84) (-10.43)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.062*** -0.002 -0.002* 0.002
(4.74) (7.28) (-0.49) (-1.79) (0.63)
%FASSETS + 0.008*** 0.086*** 0.006 -0.025*** 0.026***
(2.75) (13.14) (0.89) (-3.67) (3.61)
EQINC ? -1.289*** 2.163*** 1.238*** -0.977* -0.927
(-5.52) (4.72) (2.79) (-1.86) (-1.56)
SIZE ? -0.012*** 0.049*** 0.001 0.003* -0.001
(-16.86) (22.27) (1.27) (1.77) (-0.49)
LEV + 0.030*** -0.150*** 0.015 -0.001 -0.075***
(6.71) (-13.11) (1.16) (-0.05) (-5.03)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(3.48) (2.28) (0.26) (-4.94) (-4.14)
HHI ? 0.032*** -0.053 0.067** -0.052 0.069
(2.60) (-1.38) (1.96) (-1.47) (1.59)
GEO_SEG + -0.005*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.000 0.002
(-2.41) (11.50) (0.29) (0.13) (0.41)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.039*** 0.065*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(2.94) (4.11) (5.97) (-5.61) (-7.87)
ΔGDWL ? -0.016 0.039** 0.036 -0.010 0.037**
(-1.00) (2.06) (1.50) (-0.38) (2.06)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.000 0.085*** 0.067*** -0.060*** -0.028
(0.03) (5.62) (3.78) (-4.78) (-1.39)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.036*** 0.010 -0.007 -0.069***
(-1.43) (-3.35) (0.90) (-0.71) (-4.81)
INTANG ? 0.005** 0.004 -0.044*** 0.018** -0.010
(2.06) (0.99) (-3.34) (1.96) (-1.07)
INVMILLS ? 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.001 -0.003 -0.002
(3.42) (2.57) (0.58) (-1.45) (-0.75)
INTERCEPT ? 0.027*** -0.045*** -0.367*** 0.326*** 0.349***
(5.29) (-3.89) (-28.47) (19.95) (22.02)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.60% 51.93% 2.70% 9.54% 7.99%
TABLE 11 (continued)
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
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Panel E: Tax Avoidance and Political Directors' Political Profile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CAB_SEC ? 0.005 0.027*** -0.002 0.005 0.008
(0.97) (2.34) (-0.18) (0.48) (0.76)
SENTOR ? 0.007* 0.020 -0.014 0.015 0.010
(1.86) (1.55) (-1.45) (1.60) (0.78)
REP ? -0.001 0.001 0.015** 0.003 0.002
(-0.30) (0.12) (2.06) (0.30) (0.19)
GOV ? 0.008 -0.012 0.002 -0.005 -0.009
(1.52) (-0.82) (0.15) (-0.45) (-0.65)
ROA + 0.320*** 0.216*** -0.069*** 0.282*** 0.063***
(28.38) (15.53) (-3.03) (14.69) (2.57)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.053*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.045***
(10.99) (12.24) (3.11) (-5.83) (-10.41)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.062*** -0.002 -0.002* 0.002
(4.74) (7.27) (-0.50) (-1.80) (0.63)
%FASSETS + 0.008*** 0.086*** 0.006 -0.025*** 0.027***
(2.73) (13.06) (0.86) (-3.66) (3.60)
EQINC ? -1.298*** 2.131*** 1.257*** -0.992* -0.941
(-5.56) (4.70) (2.81) (-1.88) (-1.59)
SIZE ? -0.012*** 0.048*** 0.001 0.003* -0.001
(-17.08) (21.71) (1.30) (1.66) (-0.61)
LEV + 0.030*** -0.151*** 0.015 -0.001 -0.075***
(6.65) (-13.21) (1.14) (-0.07) (-5.07)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(3.49) (2.33) (0.26) (-4.92) (-4.09)
HHI ? 0.032*** -0.053 0.067** -0.053 0.069
(2.56) (-1.41) (1.99) (-1.50) (1.58)
GEO_SEG + -0.005*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.000 0.002
(-2.41) (11.45) (0.33) (0.11) (0.40)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.039*** 0.065*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(2.97) (4.14) (5.96) (-5.60) (-7.82)
ΔGDWL ? -0.016 0.040** 0.035 -0.010 0.037**
(-0.99) (2.09) (1.49) (-0.39) (2.05)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.000 0.085*** 0.068*** -0.060*** -0.028
(0.03) (5.64) (3.78) (-4.78) (-1.39)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.036*** 0.010 -0.008 -0.069***
(-1.43) (-3.32) (0.89) (-0.73) (-4.83)
INTANG ? 0.005** 0.005 -0.044*** 0.019** -0.010
(2.07) (1.01) (-3.33) (1.98) (-1.04)
INVMILLS ? 0.002*** 0.003 0.001 -0.005* -0.003
(2.02) (1.26) (0.25) (-1.85) (-1.08)
INTERCEPT ? 0.027*** -0.052*** -0.367*** 0.327*** 0.349***
(5.34) (-4.80) (-28.37) (20.06) (22.11)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.60% 51.96% 2.74% 9.56% 8.00%
Prob > F
cab_sec  = senator 0.816 0.686 0.386 0.435 0.863
cab_sec  = rep 0.246 0.099 0.098 0.876 0.706
cab_sec  = governor 0.774 0.036 0.827 0.499 0.269
senator  = rep 0.187 0.289 0.044 0.406 0.686
senator  = gov 0.895 0.099 0.187 0.147 0.288
rep  = gov 0.195 0.505 0.360 0.589 0.558
TABLE 11 (continued)
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
70 
 
Exclusion of firm-years with political directors from different party affiliations 
 Political directors from different party affiliations potentially serve simultaneously on 
the board in any given firm-year during the sample period. Indeed, the mean for 
DUAL_AFFILIATE reported in Table 1, Panel A, is 0.012; or said another way, 
approximately 446 firm-years include political directors from different political party 
affiliations who serve simultaneously on the board. While the subsample of firm-years with 
political directors from different party affiliations is relatively small, I exclude those firm-
years to mitigate misleading interpretations. I re-estimate Equation (4) and examine whether 
my results are robust to excluding firm-years with political directors from different party 
affiliations. The results in Table 12 are partly consistent with those reported in Table 5. For 
example, I find a positive and significant relation between AFFLIATE_1 and SHELTER (p-
value = 0.01). However, the joint test of significance of the coefficients on AFFILIATE_1 
and NO_AFFILIATE_1 is not significant (p-value > 0.10). Also, I do not find a statistical 
difference between AFFILIATE_2 and NO_AFFILATE_2 across all tax proxies (p-values > 
0.10), reported in Panel B. Lastly, I find a statistical difference between the coefficients on 
AFFILIATE_3 and NO_AFFILIATE_3 when DTAX and CETR are the tax avoidance 
measures (p-values < 0.05). However, the magnitude of the coefficients on AFFLIATE_3 are 
smaller than the magnitude of the coefficients on NO_AFFILIATE_3. In aggregate, the 
evidence from Table 5 and 12 suggests that political connections, rather than a political 
directors’ affiliation with the political party in power, appear to be more influential for firms’ 
aggressive tax strategies. 
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Panel A: Tax Avoidance and Political Directors' Affiliation with the Political Party that Controls the Senate, House, or White House
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
AFFILIATE_1 ? 0.267*** 0.072*** -0.017 0.012 -0.020
(2.92) (2.58) (-0.72) (0.63) (-0.74)
NO_AFFILIATE_1 ? 0.041*** 0.065** -0.016 0.014 -0.022
(2.84) (2.33) (-0.72) (0.79) (-0.79)
ROA + 0.323*** 0.220*** -0.072*** 0.283*** 0.061***
(26.66) (15.14) (-3.11) (14.62) (2.56)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.052*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.046***
(10.84) (12.12) (3.09) (-5.93) (-10.62)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.061*** -0.001 -0.002** 0.002
(4.74) (7.31) (-0.42) (-2.05) (0.62)
%FASSETS + 0.008*** 0.087*** 0.005 -0.023*** 0.026***
(2.74) (13.39) (0.71) (-3.34) (3.59)
EQINC ? -1.344*** 2.079*** 1.267*** -0.990* -1.011*
(-5.50) (4.61) (2.73) (-1.85) (-1.70)
SIZE ? -0.014*** 0.045*** 0.002 0.002 0.000
(-12.28) (17.16) (1.43) (1.17) (0.08)
LEV + 0.024*** -0.157*** 0.015 -0.003 -0.072***
(5.78) (-12.39) (1.19) (-0.18) (-4.55)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(4.05) (2.71) (0.23) (-4.69) (-3.92)
HHI ? 0.031*** -0.071* 0.077** -0.065* 0.055
(2.45) (-1.88) (2.17) (-1.85) (1.26)
GEO_SEG + -0.005** 0.037*** 0.002 -0.000 0.002
(-2.21) (11.48) (0.44) (-0.01) (0.38)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.040*** 0.064*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(2.68) (4.21) (5.92) (-5.56) (-7.91)
ΔGDWL ? -0.018 0.040** 0.032 -0.006 0.037**
(-1.08) (2.14) (1.38) (-0.23) (2.10)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.003 0.086*** 0.070*** -0.063*** -0.031
(0.39) (5.67) (3.89) (-5.06) (-1.50)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.035*** 0.009 -0.006 -0.066***
(-1.51) (-3.12) (0.76) (-0.54) (-4.49)
INTANG ? 0.005** 0.005 -0.043*** 0.019** -0.009
(2.09) (0.96) (-3.32) (2.01) (-0.93)
INVMILLS ? -0.021*** -0.033** 0.010 -0.010 0.010
(-2.54) (-2.12) (0.76) (-0.99) (0.63)
INTERCEPT ? 0.029*** -0.035** -0.370*** 0.330*** 0.350***
(5.48) (-2.26) (-27.39) (20.37) (20.50)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.67% 51.59% 2.72% 9.62% 8.13%
Prob > F
affiliate_1 = no_affiliate_1 0.272 0.199 0.986 0.834 0.691
Second-stage: Political Directors' Political Party Affiliation and Tax Avoidance Activities - Firm-years with more than one political
TABLE 12
director from different party affliations are excluded
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
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Panel B: Tax Avoidance and Political Directors' Affiliation with the Political Party that Controls the Senate and House
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
AFFILIATE_2 ? 0.040*** 0.069*** -0.011 0.013 -0.019
(2.68) (2.48) (-0.47) (0.64) (-0.69)
NO_AFFILIATE_2 ? 0.042*** 0.064** -0.018 0.013 -0.023
(2.88) (2.30) (-0.81) (0.79) (-0.81)
ROA + 0.323*** 0.220*** -0.072*** 0.283*** 0.061***
(26.65) (15.15) (-3.12) (14.69) (2.55)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.052*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.046***
(10.82) (12.12) (3.09) (-5.93) (-10.62)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.061*** -0.001 -0.002** 0.002
(4.73) (7.30) (-0.43) (-2.05) (0.62)
%FASSETS + 0.008*** 0.087*** 0.005 -0.023*** 0.026***
(2.75) (13.37) (0.70) (-3.34) (3.58)
EQINC ? -1.342*** 2.080*** 1.264*** -0.990* -1.014*
(-5.47) (4.61) (2.72) (-1.85) (-1.71)
SIZE ? -0.014*** 0.045*** 0.002 0.002 0.000
(-12.25) (17.21) (1.45) (1.16) (0.09)
LEV + 0.025*** -0.156*** 0.015 -0.003 -0.072***
(5.90) (-12.36) (1.16) (-0.19) (-4.58)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(4.02) (2.70) (0.24) (-4.69) (-3.92)
HHI ? 0.031** -0.071* 0.077** -0.065* 0.054
(2.48) (-1.87) (2.17) (-1.85) (1.26)
GEO_SEG + -0.005*** 0.037*** 0.002 -0.000 0.002
(-2.20) (11.48) (0.44) (-0.01) (0.39)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.040*** 0.064*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(2.68) (4.21) (5.94) (-5.56) (-7.91)
ΔGDWL ? -0.018 0.040** 0.033 -0.006 0.038**
(-1.09) (2.12) (1.40) (-0.23) (2.11)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.003 0.086*** 0.070*** -0.063*** -0.031
(0.40) (5.67) (3.89) (-5.07) (-1.50)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.035*** 0.009 -0.006 -0.066***
(-1.51) (-3.12) (0.76) (-0.54) (-4.49)
INTANG ? 0.005** 0.005 -0.043*** 0.019** -0.009
(2.09) (0.98) (-3.31) (2.01) (-0.93)
INVMILLS ? -0.020*** -0.031** 0.010 -0.011 0.010
(-2.48) (-2.02) (0.74) (-1.05) (0.64)
INTERCEPT ? 0.030*** -0.035*** -0.370*** 0.330*** 0.350***
(5.47) (-2.41) (-27.30) (20.46) (20.63)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.67% 51.59% 2.73% 9.62% 8.13%
Prob > F
affiliate_2 = no_affiliate_2 0.384 0.387 0.144 0.901 0.467
TABLE 12 (continued)
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
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Panel C: Tax Avoidance and Political Directors Affiliation with the Political Party the controls the Senate, House, and White House
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
AFFILIATE_3 ? 0.037*** 0.068*** -0.013 0.018 -0.013
(2.44) (2.48) (-0.55) (0.90) (-0.47)
NO_AFFILIATE_3 ? 0.043*** 0.065** -0.017 0.012 -0.024
(2.94) (2.30) (-0.77) (0.71) (-0.86)
ROA + 0.323*** 0.220*** -0.072*** 0.283*** 0.061***
(26.66) (15.17) (-3.11) (14.70) (2.54)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.052*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.046***
(10.82) (12.12) (3.09) (-5.92) (-10.60)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.061*** -0.001 -0.002** 0.002
(4.73) (7.30) (-0.42) (-2.05) (0.62)
%FASSETS + 0.008*** 0.087*** 0.005 -0.023*** 0.026***
(2.75) (13.37) (0.70) (-3.35) (3.57)
EQINC ? -1.342*** 2.082*** 1.266*** -0.992* -1.016*
(-5.47) (4.62) (2.72) (-1.85) (-1.71)
SIZE ? -0.014*** 0.045*** 0.002 0.002 0.000
(-12.34) (17.26) (1.45) (1.17) (0.10)
LEV + 0.025*** -0.156*** 0.015 -0.004 -0.072***
(5.91) (-12.33) (1.18) (-0.19) (-4.57)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(4.02) (2.69) (0.24) (-4.68) (-3.91)
HHI ? 0.031** -0.071* 0.077** -0.065* 0.054
(2.49) (-1.87) (2.17) (-1.86) (1.25)
GEO_SEG + -0.005** 0.037*** 0.002 -0.000 0.002
(-2.19) (11.48) (0.43) (-0.01) (0.38)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.040*** 0.064*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(2.69) (4.20) (5.93) (-5.55) (-7.92)
ΔGDWL ? -0.018 0.039** 0.032 -0.006 0.038**
(-1.10) (2.12) (1.39) (-0.22) (2.13)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.003 0.086*** 0.070*** -0.063*** -0.031
(0.40) (5.67) (3.89) (-5.06) (-1.50)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.035*** 0.009 -0.006 -0.066***
(-1.51) (-3.12) (0.76) (-0.53) (-4.49)
INTANG ? 0.005** 0.005 -0.043*** 0.019** -0.009
(2.10) (0.97) (-3.32) (2.00) (-0.94)
INVMILLS ? -0.020*** -0.031** 0.011 -0.011 0.010
(-2.51) (-2.00) (0.76) (-1.06) (0.65)
INTERCEPT ? 0.029*** -0.034** -0.370*** 0.330*** 0.350***
(5.45) (-2.07) (-27.34) (20.41) (20.66)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.67% 51.59% 2.73% 9.63% 8.14%
Prob > F
affiliate_3 = no_affiliate_3 0.046 0.529 0.479 0.428 0.022
TABLE 12 (continued)
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
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Analysis of political directors’ party affiliation to each branch of government 
In this analysis, I examine political directors’ affiliation to the branch of government 
in power on a more granular level, and report the results in Table 13. First, I examine 
whether a political director’s affiliation to the political party that controls Congress 
(AFFILIATE_CONGRESS) matters for firms’ tax avoidance activities, and present the results 
in Panel A.43 I find a positive and significant association between AFFILIATE_CONRESS 
and SHELTER (p-value < 0.01). Next, I examine whether a political director’s affiliation with 
the political party that controls the white house (AFFILIATE_WHOUSE) affects firms’ tax 
avoidance strategies. The estimates reported in Panel B also show a positive and significant 
relation between AFFILIATE_WHOUSE and SHELTER (p-value < 0.05). Therefore, I 
complete the analysis and perform a joint test of significance between the coefficients on 
AFFILIATE_CONGRESS and AFFILIATE_WHOUSE across all my proxies for tax 
avoidance. The results are reported in Panel C. I find that the coefficients are statistically 
different when TA_ETR is the tax avoidance proxy (p-value < 0.01). I do not find a statistical 
difference between both coefficients when the other tax measures serve as my proxies for tax 
avoidance (p-values > 0.10). Nonetheless, the results suggest political directors affiliated 
with the political party that controls Congress are more tax aggressive relative to political 
directors affiliated with the political party that controls the white house. 
 
  
                                                          
43 The means reported in Table 1, Panel A, show a lack of variation in firm-years when either political party 
controlled the senate (AFFILIATE_SENATE) or house (AFFILIATE_HOUSE) (0.054). Therefore, I group firm-
years and construct variable AFFILIATE_CONGRESS, which measures political directors’ affiliation with 
either the senate or house. 
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Panel A: Political Directors' Affiliation with the Political Party that Controls the Congress
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
AFFILIATE_CONGRESS ? 0.001 0.017*** 0.005 0.001 0.000
(0.23) (2.71) (1.12) (0.14) (0.05)
ROA + 0.319*** 0.215*** -0.069*** 0.282*** 0.063***
(28.37) (15.42) (-3.03) (14.66) (2.55)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.053*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.045***
(11.07) (12.27) (3.06) (-5.83) (-10.46)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.062*** -0.002 -0.002* 0.002
(4.74) (7.27) (-0.49) (-1.80) (0.63)
%FASSETS + 0.008*** 0.086*** 0.006 -0.025*** 0.027***
(2.72) (13.22) (0.89) (-3.68) (3.62)
EQINC ? -1.285*** 2.148*** 1.233*** -0.977* -0.928
(-5.48) (4.69) (2.77) (-1.86) (-1.57)
SIZE ? -0.012*** 0.048*** 0.001 0.003* -0.001
(-16.83) (21.89) (1.18) (1.76) (-0.50)
LEV + 0.030*** -0.151*** 0.015 -0.001 -0.075***
(6.70) (-13.33) (1.13) (-0.05) (-5.01)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(3.47) (2.32) (0.28) (-4.95) (-4.13)
HHI ? 0.032** -0.054 0.066** -0.052 0.069
(2.61) (-1.43) (1.94) (-1.47) (1.59)
GEO_SEG + -0.005*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.001 0.002
(-2.39) (11.52) (0.28) (0.14) (0.41)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.039*** 0.065*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(2.94) (4.13) (5.97) (-5.60) (-7.86)
ΔGDWL ? -0.016 0.040** 0.036 -0.009 0.037**
(-1.00) (2.10) (1.51) (-0.38) (2.06)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.000 0.085*** 0.067*** -0.060*** -0.028
(0.03) (5.60) (3.79) (-4.79) (-1.39)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.036*** 0.010 -0.007 -0.069***
(-1.43) (-3.33) (0.90) (-0.71) (-4.81)
INTANG ? 0.005** 0.005 -0.044*** 0.018** -0.010
(2.06) (1.01) (-3.34) (1.96) (-1.06)
INVMILLS ? 0.003*** 0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.002
(2.50) (1.23) (0.18) (-1.39) (-0.76)
INTERCEPT ? 0.026*** -0.047*** -0.367*** 0.326*** 0.349***
(5.18) (-2.94) (-28.62) (19.88) (22.22)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.59% 51.94% 2.71% 9.54% 7.99%
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
Second-stage: Tax Avoidance and Political Directors' Affiliation with the Branch of Government in Power
TABLE 13
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
AFFILIATE_WHOUSE ? 0.002 0.013** -0.005 0.004 0.005
(0.45) (2.00) (-1.13) (0.66) (0.92)
ROA + 0.319*** 0.216*** -0.069*** 0.282*** 0.063***
(28.41) (15.47) (-3.04) (14.64) (2.56)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.053*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.045***
(11.06) (12.25) (3.06) (-5.82) (-10.45)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.062*** -0.002 -0.002* 0.002
(4.74) (7.28) (-0.50) (-1.79) (0.64)
%FASSETS + 0.008*** 0.086*** 0.006 -0.025*** 0.027***
(2.72) (13.18) (0.88) (-3.67) (3.63)
EQINC ? -1.285*** 2.158*** 1.241*** -0.977* -0.929
(-5.51) (4.72) (2.79) (-1.86) (-1.57)
SIZE ? -0.012*** 0.048*** 0.001 0.003* -0.001
(-17.11) (21.98) (1.37) (1.66) (-0.57)
LEV + 0.030*** -0.151*** 0.016 -0.001 -0.075***
(6.62) (-13.24) (1.19) (-0.06) (-5.00)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(3.49) (2.30) (0.24) (-4.92) (-4.10)
HHI ? 0.032** -0.054 0.067** -0.052 0.069
(2.60) (-1.42) (1.98) (-1.48) (1.58)
GEO_SEG + -0.005*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.000 0.002
(-2.39) (11.50) (0.29) (0.13) (0.41)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.039*** 0.065*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(2.94) (4.10) (5.97) (-5.60) (-7.86)
ΔGDWL ? -0.016 0.040** 0.036 -0.009 0.037**
(-0.99) (2.11) (1.50) (-0.38) (2.05)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.000 0.085*** 0.067*** -0.060*** -0.028
(0.03) (5.62) (3.78) (-4.79) (-1.39)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.036*** 0.010 -0.007 -0.069***
(-1.43) (-3.33) (0.89) (-0.71) (-4.80)
INTANG ? 0.005** 0.004 -0.044*** 0.019** -0.010
(2.06) (0.97) (-3.34) (1.96) (-1.06)
INVMILLS ? 0.003*** 0.003 0.003 -0.004 -0.003
(2.58) (1.21) (1.05) (-1.59) (-1.07)
INTERCEPT ? 0.026*** -0.043*** -0.367*** 0.326*** 0.349***
(5.19) (-2.43) (-28.67) (19.82) (22.10)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.59% 51.94% 2.71% 9.54% 7.99%
TABLE 13 (continued)
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
Panel B: Political Directors' Affiliation with the Political Party that Controls the White House
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Panel C: Political Directors' Affiliation with the Political Party that Controls the Congress Relative to the White House
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
AFFILIATE_CONGRESS ? 0.000 0.013** 0.009** -0.001 -0.002
(0.01) (1.97) (2.20) (-0.09) (-0.28)
AFFILIATE_WHOUSE ? 0.002 0.007 -0.009** 0.004 0.005
(0.32) (1.07) (-2.00) (0.65) (1.05)
ROA + 0.319*** 0.216*** -0.069*** 0.282*** 0.063***
(28.42) (15.46) (-3.04) (14.64) (2.56)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.053*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.045***
(11.06) (12.27) (3.06) (-5.82) (-10.45)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.062*** -0.002 -0.002* 0.002
(4.74) (7.28) (-0.50) (-1.80) (0.64)
%FASSETS + 0.008*** 0.086*** 0.006 -0.025*** 0.027***
(2.72) (13.22) (0.87) (-3.67) (3.63)
EQINC ? -1.285*** 2.148*** 1.233*** -0.977* -0.928
(-5.46) (4.69) (2.77) (-1.86) (-1.57)
SIZE ? -0.012*** 0.048*** 0.001 0.003* -0.001
(-17.16) (21.84) (1.29) (1.68) (-0.56)
LEV + 0.030*** -0.151*** 0.015 -0.001 -0.075***
(6.66) (-13.33) (1.16) (-0.06) (-5.00)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(3.49) (2.33) (0.25) (-4.92) (-4.11)
HHI ? 0.032*** -0.055 0.067** -0.052 0.069
(2.60) (-1.44) (1.96) (-1.48) (1.58)
GEO_SEG + -0.005*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.000 0.002
(-2.39) (11.51) (0.30) (0.13) (0.41)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.039*** 0.065*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(2.95) (4.13) (5.98) (-5.60) (-7.86)
ΔGDWL ? -0.016 0.040** 0.036 -0.009 0.037**
(-0.99) (2.12) (1.51) (-0.38) (2.05)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.000 0.085*** 0.067*** -0.060*** -0.028
(0.03) (5.60) (3.78) (-4.80) (-1.39)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.036*** 0.010 -0.007 -0.069***
(-1.43) (-3.33) (0.89) (-0.71) (-4.80)
INTANG ? 0.005** 0.004 -0.044*** 0.019** -0.010
(2.05) (1.00) (-3.34) (1.96) (-1.06)
INVMILLS ? 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.004 -0.003
(2.59) (0.81) (0.71) (-1.50) (-0.98)
INTERCEPT ? 0.026*** -0.045*** -0.367*** 0.326*** 0.349***
(5.16) (-2.81) (-28.69) (20.00) (22.17)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.59% 51.95% 2.72% 9.54% 7.99%
Prob > F
affiliate_congress = affiliate_whouse 0.865 0.545 0.008 0.660 0.404
TABLE 13 (continued)
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
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Directors’ former political position and affiliation with the branch in power 
 Previous analyses do not consider the political director’s joint attributes of the 
political position held while in government and affiliation to that branch of government in 
power. For this analysis, I consider whether a director’s former political position and party 
affiliation to that branch of government matters for tax avoidance. I report the results in 
Table 14. In Panel A, I examine whether a political director’s former position as a senator 
(SENATOR) and her party affiliation to the political party that controls the senate 
(AFFILIATE_SENATE) is associated with tax avoidance. The variable of interest is the 
interaction term SENATOR*AFFILIATE_SENATE. I find no relation between senators 
affiliated to the political party that controls the senate and tax avoidance (p-value > 0.10) 
across all tax avoidance proxies. The estimates for the main effect variables are consistent 
with previously reported results. For example, senators are associated with aggressive tax 
avoidance (column (1), p-value < 0.10) and political directors affiliated with the political 
party that controls the senate are associated with engaging in tax shelter activities (column 
(2), p-value = 0.05) The evidence in Panel A suggests that the joint characteristic of former 
senators affiliated with the political party in control of the senate have no incremental effect 
on firms’ tax avoidance activities.  
Next, I examine whether the joint characteristic of a representative (REP) and her 
affiliation to the political party that controls the house (AFFILIATE_HOUSE) is related to 
firms’ tax avoidance activities. The results in Panel B, column (2) show a negative and 
marginally significant relation on the interaction term REP*AFFILIATE_HOUSE (p-value < 
0.10), and a positive and significant relation on the main effect variable AFFILIATE_HOUSE 
(p-values < 0.01). In aggregate, the results suggest that former representatives affiliated with 
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the political party that controls the house moderate firms’ tax aggressive positions. Overall, 
the findings in Table 14 suggest that the joint characteristics of the political director 
influences the level of tax aggressiveness firms undertake. 
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Panel A: Former Senators' Affiliation with the Political Party that Controls the Senate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
SENATOR ? 0.013* 0.005 -0.010 0.014 0.012
(1.70) (0.31) (-0.81) (0.99) (0.78)
AFFILIATE_SENATE ? 0.001 0.012** 0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.15) (1.95) (0.12) (-0.35) (-0.12)
SENATOR*AFFILIATE_SENATE ? -0.008 0.017 0.001 0.003 -0.004
(-0.83) (0.95) (0.09) (0.20) (-0.23)
ROA + 0.320*** 0.216*** -0.273*** 0.282*** 0.063***
(28.33) (15.48) (-15.64) (14.64) (2.56)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.053*** 0.020*** -0.021*** -0.045***
(11.07) (12.27) (6.22) (-5.84) (-10.45)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.062*** 0.002** -0.002* 0.002
(4.74) (7.27) (1.89) (-1.80) (0.63)
%FASSETS + 0.008*** 0.086*** 0.018*** -0.025*** 0.027***
(2.72) (13.17) (2.99) (-3.64) (3.63)
EQINC ? -1.293*** 2.139*** 0.669 -0.987* -0.934
(-5.50) (4.68) (1.43) (-1.88) (-1.58)
SIZE ? -0.012*** 0.048*** 0.000 0.003* -0.001
(-16.89) (21.91) (0.07) (1.71) (-0.54)
LEV + 0.030*** -0.151*** -0.004 -0.001 -0.075***
(6.69) (-13.30) (-0.28) (-0.06) (-5.02)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003***
(3.49) (2.34) (5.15) (-4.93) (-4.10)
HHI ? 0.032** -0.055 0.061** -0.053 0.068
(2.55) (-1.46) (1.83) (-1.51) (1.57)
GEO_SEG + -0.005*** 0.037*** -0.000 0.000 0.002
(-2.39) (11.44) (-0.08) (0.10) (0.40)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.039*** 0.064*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(2.95) (4.14) (5.42) (-5.60) (-7.86)
ΔGDWL ? -0.016 0.040** 0.017 -0.010 0.037**
(-0.99) (2.11) (0.76) (-0.39) (2.05)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.000 0.085*** 0.062*** -0.060*** -0.028
(0.04) (5.62) (4.95) (-4.79) (-1.38)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.036*** 0.007 -0.008 -0.069***
(-1.45) (-3.36) (0.76) (-0.74) (-4.81)
INTANG ? 0.005** 0.005 -0.021*** 0.019** -0.010
(2.07) (1.01) (-2.64) (1.97) (-1.06)
INVMILLS ? 0.003** 0.003 0.003 -0.004* -0.003
(2.12) (1.19) (1.32) (-1.62) (-0.90)
INTERCEPT ? 0.026*** -0.050*** 0.002 0.327*** 0.349***
(5.23) (-4.61) (0.19) (20.00) (22.28)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.60% 51.95% 4.52% 9.56% 7.99%
Second-stage: Tax Avoidance and Political Directors' Former Political Position and Affiliation with the Branch of Government in 
TABLE 14
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
 
  
81 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
REP ? 0.007 0.014 0.004 0.015 -0.000
(1.12) (1.11) (0.52) (1.35) (-0.01)
AFFILIATE_HOUSE ? 0.003 0.022*** -0.000 0.004 -0.002
(0.91) (3.00) (-0.01) (0.57) (-0.36)
REP*AFFILIATE_HOUSE ? -0.010 -0.026* 0.013 -0.017 0.008
(-1.41) (-1.66) (1.38) (-1.59) (0.46)
ROA + 0.319*** 0.216*** -0.069*** 0.282*** 0.063***
(28.40) (15.38) (-3.04) (14.74) (2.56)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.053*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.045***
(11.07) (12.26) (3.07) (-5.83) (-10.45)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.062*** -0.002 -0.002* 0.002
(4.74) (7.27) (-0.49) (-1.80) (0.63)
%FASSETS + 0.008*** 0.086*** 0.006 -0.025*** 0.026***
(2.71) (13.24) (0.88) (-3.67) (3.62)
EQINC ? -1.287*** 2.141*** 1.242*** -0.977* -0.924
(-5.48) (4.66) (2.78) (-1.86) (-1.56)
SIZE ? -0.012*** 0.048*** 0.001 0.003* -0.001
(-16.85) (21.71) (1.19) (1.72) (-0.49)
LEV + 0.030*** -0.151*** 0.015 -0.001 -0.075***
(6.65) (-13.38) (1.12) (-0.06) (-5.01)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(3.48) (2.33) (0.30) (-4.94) (-4.13)
HHI ? 0.033*** -0.054 0.065** -0.051 0.068
(2.62) (-1.42) (1.92) (-1.46) (1.57)
GEO_SEG + -0.005*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.001 0.002
(-2.38) (11.52) (0.29) (0.14) (0.41)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.039*** 0.064*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(2.95) (4.14) (5.97) (-5.61) (-7.87)
ΔGDWL ? -0.016 0.039** 0.036 -0.010 0.037**
(-1.00) (2.08) (1.50) (-0.39) (2.06)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.000 0.085*** 0.068*** -0.060*** -0.028
(0.03) (5.61) (3.78) (-4.79) (-1.39)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.036*** 0.010 -0.008 -0.069***
(-1.45) (-3.33) (0.89) (-0.73) (-4.81)
INTANG ? 0.005** 0.004 -0.043*** 0.019** -0.010
(2.06) (1.00) (-3.32) (1.97) (-1.06)
INVMILLS ? 0.003** 0.002 0.000 -0.004* -0.002
(2.13) (0.77) (0.05) (-1.73) (-0.66)
INTERCEPT ? 0.026*** -0.044*** -0.366 0.327*** 0.349***
(5.20) (-3.26) (-28.63) (19.92) (22.21)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.59% 51.95% 2.73% 9.55% 7.99%
Panel B: Former Representatives' Affiliation with the Political Party that Controls the House
TABLE 14 (continued)
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
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ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
Tax policy experience 
The main analyses in this study examine whether certain characteristics of politically 
connected directors, facilitated by the strength of the political director’s connections to 
current government officials, influence firms’ tax outcomes. For this analysis, I examine 
whether a politically connected director’s knowledge of the tax legislative environment, i.e., 
tax policy experience, is related to firms’ tax avoidance activities. The U.S. Constitution 
grants Congress the power to tax, which is accomplished primarily through three 
congressional committees: House Ways and Means Committee, Senate Finance Committee, 
and Joint Committee on Taxation.  Members of these committees are tasked with writing the 
nation’s tax laws and setting tax policy.44 Accordingly, it is logical to assume that political 
directors who served on tax-writing committees have a greater working knowledge to 
navigate complex tax legislative processes, compared to directors without tax policy 
experience. Also, the IRS Commissioner establishes and interprets tax administration policy, 
and likely represents an additional measure of tax expertise.45 Thus, I also consider that an 
IRS Commissioner has tax policy experience.  
Palmer and Schneer (2015) report that human and social capital developed through 
committee service is valuable, particularly committees that craft the nation’s laws, because  
44 The House Ways and Means Committee is the chief-tax writing committee of the United States. Tax 
legislation is so important that most Committee members must serve in the House for several years before they 
qualify for appointment (www.waysandmeans.house.gov). The Senate Finance Committee is responsible for all 
Senate legislation dealing with tax matters (www.finance.senate.gov). The Joint Committee on Taxation 
provides information, advice, and assistance to the Ways and Means Committee concerning the revision of tax 
bill proposals. JCT has an oversight or policy role, but no legislative duties (www.jct.gov). 
45 www.irs.gov. 
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legislation has financial and regulatory implications for firms.46 On the one hand, firms that 
operate in unpredictable tax environments may appoint a political director with tax expertise, 
not to avoid taxes per se, but to preserve existing tax benefits in order to maintain a 
sustainable tax strategy (McGuire, Neuman, and Omer 2012).47 On the other hand, political 
directors’ service on tax-writing committees likely provides them with insight into predicting 
government legislative actions designed to target corporate tax avoiders. Under this scenario, 
political directors with tax policy expertise may advise firms to constrain their tax avoidance 
activities to pre-empt government inquiry and possible sanctions, or use their knowledge of 
tax policy to help develop or improve the firms’ tax planning strategies. Based on the 
discussion above, it is possible that the relation between political connections and tax 
avoidance is stronger, weaker, or has no effect for firms whose political directors have tax 
policy experience. 
To examine the relationship between tax avoidance and politically connected 
directors’ tax policy expertise, I estimate the following second-stage regression model: 
TAXAVOIDi,t = α0 + β1 TAX_EXPERTi,t  + β2 NO_TAXEXPERTi,t  + γCONTROLSi,t 
                                        + φINVMILLSi,t  + δINDUSTRYi + θYEARt + εi,t                       (6) 
where all variables are defined in Appendix I. The variable of interest is TAX_EXPERT, and 
is equal to one if a politically connected director served on the Senate Finance Committee, 
House Ways and Means Committee, Joint Committee on Taxation, or as IRS Commissioner, 
and zero otherwise. Because TAX_EXPERT measures only the average difference between 
firm-years with tax expertise and firm-years with no tax expertise, I construct variable, 
                                                          
46 Palmer and Schneer (2015) examine characteristics of former senators that increase the likelihood of a board 
directorship. They find that senators who served on the Finance and Intelligence Committees are more likely to 
serve on a board. 
47 McGuire et al. (2012) define a sustainable tax strategy as consistent tax outcomes over time without regard to 
the level of tax avoidance. 
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NO_TAXEXPERT, which captures firm-years without a tax expert political director. This 
variable is equal to one for firm-years without tax policy expertise, and zero otherwise. A 
negative coefficient when DTAX, SHELTER, and TA_ETR are the dependent variables, and a 
positive coefficient when ETR or CETR serves as the dependent variable suggest that 
politically connected directors with tax experience have a weaker association with firms’ tax 
avoidance activities. However, a positive coefficient when DTAX, SHELTER, and TA_ETR 
are the dependent variables, and a negative coefficient when ETR or ETR is the dependent 
variable suggest that political directors with tax experience have a stronger association with 
firms’ tax avoidance. I then test whether the coefficients on TAX_EXPERT and 
NO_TAXEXPERT are statistically different, i.e., (β1 ≠ β2). 
 Table 15, Panel A reports the results. I find a positive and significant association 
between TAX_EXPERT and DTAX (coef. = 0.047; t = 3.30), and SHELTER (coef. = 0.077; t 
= 2.56), controlling for firm-years with no tax policy expertise (NO_TAXEXPERT ) and firm 
characteristics, which suggest that a political director’s tax expertise is associated with 
aggressive tax avoidance activities.  However, the results are similar for firm-years with no 
tax expertise. Thus, I test the statistical difference between the coefficients on TAX_EXPERT 
and NO_TAXEXPERT, and find no significant difference between the coefficients across all 
tax proxies (β1 = β2). The results suggest that a political directors network connections to 
government, rather than the political director’s tax expertise, is more valuable for firms’ tax 
outcomes. 
Alternative tax expertise measure 
For this analysis, I examine whether political directors who served in more than one 
tax expert position affects firms’ tax avoidance.  I re-estimate Equation (6) and use an 
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alternative measure of tax policy expertise. TAXEXPERT_MORE is an indicator variable 
equal to one if a politically connected director served in more than one tax expert position 
while in government, and zero otherwise.  The results are reported in Table 15, Panel B. I 
find a positive and significant coefficient on TAXEXPERT_MORE when SHELTER (coef. = 
0.087; t = 2.18) and ETR (coef. = 0.029; t = 1.76) are the tax avoidance measures, controlling 
for firm-years with no tax experts (NO_ TAXEXPERT) and firm characteristics. However, 
consistent with the main results reported in Panel A, I do not find a statistical difference 
between the coefficients on TAXEXPERT_MORE and NO_ TAXEXPERT (p-values > 0.10). 
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Panel A: Political Directors with Tax Expertise Compared to Political Directors without Tax Expertise
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TAX_EXPERT ? 0.047*** 0.077*** -0.017 0.018 -0.012
(3.30) (2.56) (-0.70) (0.94) (-0.41)
NO_TAXEXPERT ? 0.041*** 0.079*** -0.014 0.016 -0.012
(2.90) (2.85) (-0.63) (0.93) (-0.43)
ROA + 0.323*** 0.222*** -0.070*** 0.283*** 0.062***
(26.88) (15.19) (-3.10) (14.70) (2.54)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.052*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.045***
(10.94) (12.21) (3.06) (-5.87) (-10.54)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.062*** -0.002 -0.002* 0.002
(4.74) (7.26) (-0.49) (-1.86) (0.61)
%FASSETS + 0.008*** 0.087*** 0.006 -0.025*** 0.026***
(2.87) (13.51) (0.85) (-3.63) (3.56)
EQINC ? -1.316*** 2.095*** 1.248*** -0.984* -0.920
(-5.74) (4.65) (2.79) (-1.87) (-1.55)
SIZE ? -0.014*** 0.045*** 0.002 0.002 -0.000
(-12.16) (17.10) (1.45) (1.11) (-0.06)
LEV + 0.025*** -0.160*** 0.017 -0.003 -0.073***
(5.92) (-13.08) (1.32) (-0.15) (-4.48)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(4.01) (2.67) (0.17) (-4.83) (-4.00)
HHI ? 0.029** -0.063* 0.068** -0.053 0.070*
(2.29) (-1.68) (1.97) (-1.51) (1.61)
GEO_SEG + -0.005*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.000 0.002
(-2.42) (11.58) (0.29) (0.13) (0.42)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.039*** 0.064*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(2.97) (4.17) (5.93) (-5.59) (-7.88)
ΔGDWL ? -0.016 0.039** 0.036 -0.010 0.037**
(-1.02) (2.06) (1.53) (-0.41) (2.07)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.001 0.086*** 0.067*** -0.060*** -0.028
(0.15) (5.69) (3.74) (-4.74) (-1.40)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.036*** 0.010 -0.007 -0.069***
(-1.47) (-3.35) (0.90) (-0.71) (-4.82)
INTANG ? 0.004** 0.004 -0.044*** 0.019** -0.010
(2.06) (0.94) (-3.38) (2.00) (-1.09)
INVMILLS ? -0.020*** -0.037 0.010 -0.012 0.005
(-2.48) (-2.42) (0.71) (-1.21) (0.30)
INTERCEPT ? 0.030*** -0.036** -0.369*** 0.328*** 0.348***
(5.56) (-2.18) (-27.28) (19.88) (20.74)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.62% 51.96% 2.70% 9.54% 7.99%
Prob > F
tax_expert = no_taxexpert 0.244 0.909 0.828 0.896 0.975
Second-stage: Tax Avoidance and Political Directors' Tax Expertise 
TABLE 15
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TAXEXPERT_MORE ? -0.006 0.087** -0.029 0.029* 0.018
(-0.45) (2.18) (-1.13) (1.76) (0.68)
NO_TAXEXPERT ? 0.007 0.037*** -0.007 0.008 -0.000
(1.02) (2.57) (-0.46) (0.69) (-0.01)
ROA + 0.320*** 0.218*** -0.069*** 0.282*** 0.063***
(27.91) (15.56) (-3.02) (14.64) (2.54)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.053*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.045***
(11.03) (12.26) (3.06) (-5.87) (-10.54)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.062*** -0.002 -0.002* 0.002
(4.74) (7.26) (-0.49) (-1.82) (0.61)
%FASSETS + 0.008*** 0.086*** 0.006 -0.025*** 0.027***
(2.72) (13.39) (0.86) (-3.63) (3.59)
EQINC ? -1.291*** 2.145*** 1.235*** -0.972* -0.924
(-5.57) (4.73) (2.77) (-1.84) (-1.56)
SIZE ? -0.012*** 0.047*** 0.002 0.002 -0.001
(-15.87) (21.68) (1.37) (1.35) (-0.40)
LEV + 0.029*** -0.155*** 0.016 -0.002 -0.075***
(7.03) (-13.21) (1.26) (-0.10) (-4.74)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(3.66) (2.51) (0.21) (-4.86) (-3.95)
HHI ? 0.032*** -0.056 0.067** -0.052 0.069
(2.59) (-1.47) (1.95) (-1.49) (1.59)
GEO_SEG + -0.005*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.000 0.002
(-2.40) (11.57) (0.29) (0.13) (0.42)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.039*** 0.064*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(2.94) (4.13) (5.96) (-5.62) (-7.91)
ΔGDWL ? -0.016 0.039** 0.036 -0.010 0.037**
(-1.03) (2.06) (1.52) (-0.41) (2.05)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.001 0.085*** 0.067*** -0.060*** -0.028
(0.09) (5.65) (3.75) (-4.75) (-1.40)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.036*** 0.010 -0.007 -0.069***
(-1.42) (-3.35) (0.90) (-0.71) (-4.81)
INTANG ? 0.004** 0.004 -0.044*** 0.019** -0.010
(2.06) (0.96) (-3.38) (2.00) (-1.05)
INVMILLS ? -0.000 -0.013* 0.005 -0.008 -0.002
(-0.03) (-1.65) (0.59) (-1.15) (-0.23)
INTERCEPT ? 0.027*** -0.042*** -0.368*** 0.327*** 0.349***
(5.12) (-2.49) (-27.79) (19.56) (21.77)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.58% 51.95% 2.71% 9.55% 7.99%
Prob > F
taxexpert_more = no_taxexpert 0.167 0.186 0.279 0.173 0.402
TABLE 15 (continued)
Panel B: Tax Avoidance and Politically Connected Directors who Served in Multiple Tax Expert Positions
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
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Analysis of each tax expertise position 
 Table 16 reports the results from re-estimating Equation (6) for each tax expert 
position. First, I examine the effect of political directors’ service on the House Ways and 
Means Committee (WAYS_MEANS) on firms’ tax avoidance activities. The estimates in 
Panel A provide some evidence of a statistical relation between TAXAVOID and 
WAYS_MEANS. Specifically, the coefficient is significant and negative when DTAX serves as 
the tax avoidance proxy (coef. = -0.012; t = -1.76), which suggests that the association 
between political connections and tax avoidance is weaker for firms whose politically 
connected directors served on the Ways and Means Committee. Next, I examine the relation 
between political directors’ service on the Senate Finance Committee (FINANCE_CMTE) 
and firms’ tax avoidance activities. The results are reported in Panel B. The estimates provide 
evidence of a positive statistical relation between tax avoidance and a political director’s 
service on the Senate Finance Committee, when DTAX is the tax proxy (p-value < 0.01). 
Panel C reports the results for the relation between political directors’ service on the 
Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) and firms’ tax avoidance. I find evidence that firms with 
political directors who served on the Joint Committee on Taxation exhibit lower levels of tax 
avoidance. Specifically, the coefficient is -0.056 (t = -2.12) when SHELTER is the measure 
of tax avoidance, and 0.042 (t = 3.93) when ETR is the measure of tax avoidance. Next, I 
consider the effect of political directors’ tax expertise as IRS Commissioner (IRS_COMM) 
on firms’ tax avoidance. The estimates reported in Panel D show a positive statistical relation 
between IRS_COMM and DTAX (p-value < 0.05). 
To complete the analysis, I perform a joint test of significance between the 
coefficients on each tax expert position. Accordingly, I re-estimate Equation (6) and include 
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all four tax expert variables. The difference between coefficients reported in Panel E show 
that when DTAX is the measure of tax avoidance, the association between political 
connections and tax avoidance is more positive for firms whose directors served on the 
Finance Committee or as IRS Commissioner, compared to firms whose directors served on 
the Ways and Means Committee (p-values < 0.01).  With regard to the tax shelter score, I 
find a statistical difference between the coefficients on FINANCE_CMTE and JCT (p-value < 
0.01), and marginal significant difference between FINANCE_CMTE and IRS_COMM (p-
value = 0.10).  
Moreover, when ETR is the measure of tax avoidance, I find that the association 
between political connections and tax avoidance is statistically more negative for firms 
whose political directors served on the Finance Committee, compared to political directors 
who served on the Joint Committee on Taxation. I do not find a statistical difference between 
coefficients when TA_ETR or CETR is the measure of tax avoidance (p-values > 0.10). 
Overall, the results suggest that political directors who served on Senate Finance Committee 
are likely to have better political connections to current members of Congress, and to exploit 
those connections, as evidenced by higher levels of tax aggressiveness, compared to political 
directors who served in other tax expert positions.  
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Panel A: Political Directors' Tax Expertise - House Ways and Means Committee Member
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
WAYS_MEANS ? -0.012* 0.010 0.006 0.006 0.009
(-1.76) (0.35) (0.29) (0.26) (0.35)
ROA + 0.319*** 0.215*** -0.069*** 0.282*** 0.063***
(28.37) (15.48) (-3.03) (14.67) (2.55)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.053*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.045***
(11.05) (12.26) (3.06) (-5.82) (-10.44)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.062*** -0.002 -0.002* 0.002
(4.74) (7.27) (-0.49) (-1.80) (0.63)
%FASSETS + 0.008*** 0.086*** 0.006 -0.025*** 0.027***
(2.72) (13.18) (0.89) (-3.68) (3.62)
EQINC ? -1.289*** 2.167*** 1.241*** -0.974* -0.924
(-5.52) (4.73) (2.79) (-1.85) (-1.55)
SIZE ? -0.012*** 0.049*** 0.001 0.003* -0.001
(-16.83) (22.36) (1.25) (1.76) (-0.51)
LEV + 0.030*** -0.150*** 0.015 -0.001 -0.075***
(6.70) (-13.15) (1.16) (-0.05) (-5.04)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(3.45) (2.28) (0.26) (-4.95) (-4.13)
HHI ? 0.032*** -0.052 0.067** -0.052 0.069
(2.60) (-1.37) (1.97) (-1.47) (1.59)
GEO_SEG + -0.005*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.001 0.002
(-2.39) (11.52) (0.29) (0.14) (0.41)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.039*** 0.065*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(2.94) (4.11) (5.96) (-5.61) (-7.87)
ΔGDWL ? -0.016 0.039** 0.036 -0.010 0.037**
(-1.00) (2.06) (1.50) (-0.38) (2.05)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.000 0.085*** 0.067*** -0.060*** -0.028
(0.03) (5.63) (3.78) (-4.80) (-1.39)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.036*** 0.010 -0.007 -0.069***
(-1.41) (-3.35) (0.90) (-0.71) (-4.81)
INTANG ? 0.005** 0.004 -0.044*** 0.019** -0.010
(2.06) (0.99) (-3.34) (1.96) (-1.06)
INVMILLS ? 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.001 -0.003 -0.002
(3.80) (2.49) (0.57) (-1.59) (-0.88)
INTERCEPT ? 0.026*** -0.044*** -0.367*** 0.326*** 0.349***
(5.19) (-2.61) (-28.63) (19.77) (22.10)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.59% 51.93% 2.70% 9.54% 7.99%
Second-stage: Tax Avoidance and each Tax Expertise Position
TABLE 16
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
FINANCE_CMTE ? 0.013*** 0.030 -0.011 -0.002 0.003
(2.88) (1.58) (-0.69) (-0.14) (0.23)
ROA + 0.319*** 0.215*** -0.069*** 0.282*** 0.063***
(28.32) (15.48) (-3.05) (14.65) (2.56)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.053*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.045***
(11.06) (12.23) (3.06) (-5.82) (-10.44)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.062*** -0.002 -0.002* 0.002
(4.74) (7.28) (-0.49) (-1.80) (0.63)
%FASSETS + 0.008*** 0.086*** 0.006 -0.025*** 0.027***
(2.72) (13.15) (0.89) (-3.68) (3.62)
EQINC ? -1.288*** 2.154*** 1.239*** -0.976* -0.929
(-5.52) (4.70) (2.79) (-1.86) (-1.57)
SIZE ? -0.012*** 0.049*** 0.001 0.003* -0.001
(-16.70) (22.12) (1.32) (1.78) (-0.51)
LEV + 0.030*** -0.150*** 0.015 -0.001 -0.075***
(6.66) (-13.18) (1.16) (-0.04) (-5.03)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(3.48) (2.29) (0.26) (-4.94) (-4.13)
HHI ? 0.033*** -0.052 0.066** -0.052 0.069
(2.61) (-1.38) (1.95) (-1.47) (1.59)
GEO_SEG + -0.005*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.001 0.002
(-2.39) (11.50) (0.29) (0.14) (0.41)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.039*** 0.064*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(2.95) (4.12) (5.94) (-5.59) (-7.87)
ΔGDWL ? -0.016 0.039** 0.036 -0.009 0.037**
(-0.99) (2.08) (1.50) (-0.38) (2.06)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.000 0.085*** 0.068*** -0.060*** -0.028
(0.03) (5.60) (3.79) (-4.77) (-1.39)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.036*** 0.010 -0.007 -0.069***
(-1.43) (-3.35) (0.89) (-0.71) (-4.81)
INTANG ? 0.005** 0.004 -0.044*** 0.018** -0.010
(2.06) (1.00) (-3.34) (1.96) (-1.07)
INVMILLS ? 0.003*** 0.006** 0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(3.18) (2.32) (0.71) (-1.44) (-0.84)
INTERCEPT ? 0.026*** -0.044*** -0.367*** 0.326*** 0.349***
(5.23) (-2.55) (-28.61) (19.88) (22.13)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.60% 51.94% 2.71% 9.54% 7.99%
TABLE 16 (continued)
Panel B: Political Directors' Tax Expertise -Senate Finance Committee Member
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
JCT ? -0.008 -0.056** 0.003 0.042*** -0.021
(-0.51) (-2.12) (0.20) (3.93) (-0.39)
ROA + 0.319*** 0.215*** -0.069*** 0.282*** 0.063***
(28.36) (15.50) (-3.03) (14.68) (2.55)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.053*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.045***
(11.07) (12.25) (3.06) (-5.82) (-10.48)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.062*** -0.002 -0.002* 0.002
(4.74) (7.28) (-0.49) (-1.80) (0.63)
%FASSETS + 0.008*** 0.086*** 0.006 -0.025*** 0.027***
(2.72) (13.16) (0.89) (-3.68) (3.62)
EQINC ? -1.286*** 2.155*** 1.238*** -0.971* -0.929
(-5.50) (4.72) (2.79) (-1.85) (-1.57)
SIZE ? -0.012*** 0.049*** 0.001 0.003* -0.001
(-16.84) (22.37) (1.26) (1.74) (-0.48)
LEV + 0.030*** -0.150*** 0.015 -0.001 -0.075***
(6.68) (-13.16) (1.16) (-0.04) (-5.03)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(3.47) (2.26) (0.26) (-4.94) (-4.14)
HHI ? 0.032*** -0.053 0.067** -0.051 0.069
(2.61) (-1.39) (1.96) (-1.46) (1.58)
GEO_SEG + -0.005*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.001 0.002
(-2.39) (11.50) (0.29) (0.17) (0.40)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.039*** 0.065*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(2.94) (4.11) (5.96) (-5.61) (-7.88)
ΔGDWL ? -0.016 0.039** 0.036 -0.009 0.037**
(-1.00) (2.05) (1.50) (-0.38) (2.05)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.000 0.085*** 0.067*** -0.060*** -0.028
(0.03) (5.62) (3.78) (-4.77) (-1.39)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.036*** 0.010 -0.008 -0.069***
(-1.42) (-3.32) (0.90) (-0.73) (-4.80)
INTANG ? 0.005** 0.004 -0.044*** 0.018** -0.010
(2.06) (0.99) (-3.34) (1.96) (-1.07)
INVMILLS ? 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.001 -0.003* -0.002
(3.64) (2.69) (0.60) (-1.62) (-0.81)
INTERCEPT ? 0.026*** -0.044*** -0.367*** 0.326*** 0.349***
(5.19) (-2.61) (-28.57) (19.79) (22.07)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.59% 51.93% 2.70% 9.55% 7.99%
TABLE 16 (continued)
Panel C: Political Directors' Tax Expertise - Joint Committee on Taxation Member
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
IRS_COMM ? 0.025** -0.060 -0.057 0.016 -0.024
(2.10) (-1.19) (-0.75) (0.43) (-0.37)
ROA + 0.319*** 0.215*** -0.070*** 0.282*** 0.063***
(28.36) (15.49) (-3.08) (14.70) (2.55)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.053*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.045***
(11.08) (12.24) (3.02) (-5.86) (-10.52)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.062*** -0.002 -0.002* 0.002
(4.74) (7.28) (-0.49) (-1.80) (0.63)
%FASSETS + 0.007*** 0.086*** 0.006 -0.025*** 0.027***
(2.69) (13.21) (0.94) (-3.68) (3.62)
EQINC ? -1.283*** 2.159*** 1.234*** -0.975* -0.930
(-5.49) (4.72) (2.78) (-1.85) (-1.57)
SIZE ? -0.012*** 0.049*** 0.001 0.003* -0.001
(-16.82) (22.40) (1.30) (1.76) (-0.49)
LEV + 0.030*** -0.150*** 0.015 -0.001 -0.075***
(6.66) (-13.10) (1.16) (-0.04) (-5.03)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(3.46) (2.28) (0.30) (-4.95) (-4.10)
HHI ? 0.032*** -0.052 0.068** -0.052 0.069
(2.57) (-1.35) (1.99) (-1.47) (1.59)
GEO_SEG + -0.005*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.001 0.002
(-2.38) (11.51) (0.27) (0.14) (0.41)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.039*** 0.064*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(2.94) (4.10) (5.96) (-5.60) (-7.86)
ΔGDWL ? -0.016 0.039** 0.035 -0.010 0.037**
(-1.01) (2.07) (1.50) (-0.39) (2.06)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.000 0.085*** 0.067*** -0.060*** -0.028
(0.03) (5.62) (3.78) (-4.78) (-1.39)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.036*** 0.010 -0.007 -0.069***
(-1.42) (-3.35) (0.91) (-0.71) (-4.81)
INTANG ? 0.005** 0.004 -0.043*** 0.018** -0.010
(2.06) (0.99) (-3.33) (1.96) (-1.06)
INVMILLS ? 0.003*** 0.007 0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(3.53) (2.69) (0.72) (-1.55) (-0.81)
INTERCEPT ? 0.026*** -0.045*** -0.367*** 0.326*** 0.349***
(5.20) (-2.63) (-28.66) (19.77) (22.02)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.59% 51.93% 2.72% 9.54% 7.99%
TABLE 16 (continued)
Panel D: Political Directors' Tax Expertise - IRS Commissioner
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
a
Pred.
Sign
DTAX
Coefficents
(t -statistic)
b, c
SHELTER
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
TA_ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
ETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
CETR
Coefficients
(t -statistic)
WAYS_MEANS ? -0.019*** 0.003 0.012 0.002 0.010
(-2.71) (0.12) (0.51) (0.09) (0.35)
FINANCE_CMTE ? 0.017*** 0.028 -0.014 -0.002 0.000
(4.72) (1.55) (-0.77) (-0.12) (0.03)
JCT ? -0.002 -0.056** -0.003 0.041*** -0.024
(-0.13) (-2.00) (-0.19) (2.71) (-0.43)
IRS_COMM ? 0.025** -0.058 -0.057 0.016 -0.024
(2.12) (-1.17) (-0.76) (0.44) (-0.37)
ROA + 0.319*** 0.215*** -0.070*** 0.282*** 0.063***
(28.36) (15.50) (-3.10) (14.69) (2.55)
NOL ? 0.026*** 0.052*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.045***
(11.05) (12.21) (3.01) (-5.84) (-10.50)
ΔNOL ? 0.016*** 0.062*** -0.002 -0.002* 0.002
(4.74) (7.28) (-0.49) (-1.80) (0.63)
%FASSETS + 0.007*** 0.086*** 0.006 -0.025*** 0.027***
(2.72) (13.17) (0.95) (-3.69) (3.62)
EQINC ? -1.295*** 2.143*** 1.242*** -0.969* -0.927
(-5.55) (4.68) (2.79) (-1.84) (-1.55)
SIZE ? -0.012*** 0.049*** 0.001 0.003* -0.001
(-16.73) (22.21) (1.35) (1.76) (-0.48)
LEV + 0.030*** -0.150*** 0.015 -0.001 -0.075***
(6.65) (-13.13) (1.16) (-0.04) (-5.04)
MTB ? 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(3.46) (2.28) (0.30) (-4.94) (-4.12)
HHI ? 0.032*** -0.052 0.067** -0.052 0.069
(2.56) (-1.35) (1.98) (-1.47) (1.59)
GEO_SEG + -0.005*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.001 0.002
(-2.40) (11.48) (0.28) (0.17) (0.40)
CASH − 0.014*** 0.039*** 0.064*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(2.96) (4.12) (5.93) (-5.59) (-7.87)
ΔGDWL ? -0.016 0.039** 0.035 -0.009 0.037**
(-1.00) (2.07) (1.49) (-0.38) (2.05)
NEW_INVEST ? 0.000 0.085*** 0.067*** -0.060*** -0.028
(0.03) (5.60) (3.79) (-4.78) (-1.40)
PP&E ? -0.007 -0.036*** 0.010 -0.008 -0.069***
(-1.39) (-3.33) (0.90) (-0.73) (-4.79)
INTANG ? 0.005** 0.005 -0.043*** 0.018** -0.010
(2.06) (1.00) (-3.33) (1.95) (-1.05)
INVMILLS ? 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(3.24) (2.45) (0.79) (-1.59) (-0.80)
INTERCEPT ? 0.027*** -0.044*** -0.368*** 0.326*** 0.349***
(5.24) (-2.58) (-28.72) (19.88) (22.01)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
26.61% 51.95% 2.73% 9.55% 7.99%
Prob > F
ways_means = finance_cmte 0.000 0.479 0.487 0.913 0.808
ways_means = jct 0.372 0.191 0.655 0.334 0.614
ways_means = irs_comm 0.000 0.270 0.366 0.747 0.631
finance_cmte = jct 0.243 0.008 0.636 0.019 0.665
finance_cmte = irs_comm 0.540 0.107 0.579 0.654 0.718
jct = irs_comm 0.187 0.966 0.493 0.542 1.000
TABLE 16 (continued)
Panel E: Tax Avoidance and Comparison of each Tax Expert Position
a
 Variables are defined in Appendix I.
b
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
c
 Standard errors are clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009).
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Alternative research design - quantile regression 
 The analyses examined in this study provide the effect of the treatment group on the 
average level of firms’ tax avoidance. Yet, the relationship between political directors and 
tax avoidance may differ at relatively high or low levels of tax avoidance. For example, 
boards with more high-profile directors may affect firms’ tax outcomes at extreme levels of 
tax avoidance because increased reputational costs may outweigh the marginal benefit of 
additional tax savings. A quantile regression, however, allows me to assess the relation 
between political director characteristics and tax avoidance in other parts of the tax 
avoidance distribution. Indeed, Armstrong et al. (2015) find no evidence of a statistical 
relation between certain board characteristics and TA_ETR using OLS regression models, 
but, using quantile regressions, they do find that more financially sophisticated boards 
moderate relatively extreme levels of tax avoidance.48 Consistent with the findings in 
Armstrong et al. (2015), I find no evidence of a statistical relation between TA_ETR and most 
political director characteristics, including the alternative measures, using the treatment 
effects model. The quantile regression results are reported in Table 18. 
 First, I re-estimate Equation (2) and examine whether the relation between politically 
connected directors and tax avoidance varies across the tax avoidance distributions. Panel A  
reports the estimates from the second stage regressions and quantile regressions. As 
previously reported, the second-stage estimates show no evidence of a statistical relation 
between PCD and LN_PCD_TOTAL when TA_ETR is the measure of tax avoidance (coef. = 
-0.015, -0.007; t = -0.65, -0.64, respectively).49 With regard to the quantile regressions, the 
estimates in column (1) do not exhibit much variation across the tax avoidance distribution, 
                                                          
48 In addition to TA_ETR, Armstrong et al. (2015) also use the ending balance of firm’s uncertain tax benefits 
(UTBs) as a second measure of tax avoidance. 
49 The second-stage estimates are those reported in Tables 3 and 8, respectively. 
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evidenced by the insignificant difference in coefficients across quantiles (p-values > 0.10). 
Column (2) reports the estimates from the quantile regression when LN_PCD_TOTAL is the 
variable of interest. Unlike the pattern in Column (1), the results in Column (2) exhibit some 
variation between the number of political directors on the board and tax avoidance at 
specified percentiles across the distribution. The difference in coefficients at the 10th 
percentile are significantly more negative than the coefficients at the 90th percentile (p-value 
< 0.05) and the 50th percentile (p-value < 0.01). Also, the difference in coefficients at the 80th 
percentile is statistically more positive than the coefficient at the 20th percentile (p-value < 
0.10). Overall, the distribution patterns suggest that firms with political directors are more tax 
aggressive because political directors likely use their political connections to curry favor with 
politicians, which provides political cover for the firm to engage in aggressive tax strategies. 
 Next, I examine whether the relation between characteristics of political directors and 
tax avoidance varies across the tax avoidance distribution. The results are reported in Panel 
B. As previously discussed, the second-stage estimates on most political director 
characteristics show no relation to tax avoidance when TA_ETR is the tax avoidance 
measure.50 In contrast, the estimates from the quantile regressions suggest a relation between 
political director characteristics and tax avoidance at extreme tails of the tax avoidance 
distribution. For example, in column (2), the coefficient at the 90th percentile (coef. = -0.019; 
t = -1.73) is statistically more negative than the coefficient at the 50th percentile (coef. = 
0.003; t = 0.70) (p-value < 0.10). This finding suggests that directors who served in multiple 
high-profile roles attenuate relatively extreme levels of tax avoidance.  
Moreover, the estimates in Column (4) show that the relation between political 
directors with more tax policy expertise and tax avoidance varies at specified percentiles 
                                                          
50 The second-state estimates are those reported in Tables 4, 10, and 15, respectively. 
97 
 
across the distribution. For example, the coefficients at the 90th percentile are statistically 
more negative than the coefficients at the 10th percentile (p-value = 0.05) and the 50th 
percentile (p-value < 0.01). Also, the coefficient at the 80th percentile (coef. = -0.024; t = -
2.02) is statistically more negative than the coefficient at the 20th percentile (coef. = 0.033; t 
= 4.58) (p-value < 0.01). This pattern suggests that boards with political directors with more 
tax policy expertise moderate extreme levels of tax avoidance. Political directors with this 
characteristic-type are likely more informed about forthcoming tax law changes and 
potentially limit firms’ aggressive tax avoidance activities to mitigate political costs.  
 
98 
 
Quantile Regression
Panel A: Presence of Politically Connected Directors
Dependent Variable
Independent Variable
Coef. t -stat Coef. t -stat
Second-stage estimates -0.015 (-0.65) -0.007 (-0.64)
Quantile
0.10 0.025 2.60 -0.015 -1.20
0.20 0.028 3.66 0.005 0.69
0.30 0.032 5.35 0.016 2.69
0.40 0.028 5.43 0.016 3.72
0.50 0.027 6.32 0.018 3.62
0.60 0.019 3.45 0.016 4.42
0.70 0.020 3.09 0.021 3.69
0.80 0.016 1.38 0.021 3.06
0.90 0.011 0.53 0.011 1.00
Avg Pseudo R
2
0.040 0.039
Q(0.80) = Q(0.20) 0.185 0.081
Q(0.90) = Q(0.10) 0.346 0.046
Q(0.90) = Q(0.50) 0.394 0.411
Q(0.10) = Q(0.50) 0.815 0.001
Panel B: Politically Connected Directors' Political Profile and Tax Policy Experience
Dependent Variable
Independent Variable
Coef. t -stat Coef. t -stat Coef. t -stat Coef. t -stat
Second-stage estimates -0.012 (-0.53) -0.008 (-0.86) -0.017 (-0.70) -0.029 (-1.13)
Quantile
0.10 0.029 2.71 0.008 0.70 0.012 0.48 0.037 0.75
0.20 0.032 3.36 0.011 1.84 0.027 3.56 0.033 4.58
0.30 0.034 6.06 0.006 1.12 0.027 3.27 0.027 3.08
0.40 0.029 5.35 0.004 0.97 0.029 6.06 0.020 2.75
0.50 0.027 6.96 0.003 0.70 0.025 6.39 0.005 0.75
0.60 0.019 4.03 -0.002 -0.60 0.020 2.28 0.000 0.05
0.70 0.019 3.48 -0.002 -0.42 0.015 1.71 -0.008 -1.05
0.80 0.015 1.18 -0.001 -0.15 0.008 0.42 -0.024 -2.02
0.90 0.011 0.61 -0.019 -1.73 0.019 0.63 -0.069 -3.65
Avg Pseudo R
2
0.040 0.039 0.040 0.040
Q(0.80) = Q(0.20) 0.185 0.222 0.294 0.000
Q(0.90) = Q(0.10) 0.346 0.145 0.870 0.052
Q(0.90) = Q(0.50) 0.394 0.076 0.825 0.000
Q(0.10) = Q(0.50) 0.815 0.642 0.057 0.528
PCD LN_PCD_TOTAL
TABLE 17
(1) (2)
TA_ETR TA_ETR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TA_ETR TA_ETR TA_ETR TA_ETR
High_Profile HighProfile_more Tax_Expert TaxExpert_more
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VI. CONCLUSIONS  
  
My study examines whether the characteristics of politically connected directors 
influence firms’ tax avoidance activities. This study is the first to attempt to empirically 
identify underlying mechanisms by which political directors influence firms’ tax avoidance 
strategies. I use the BoardEx database to identify directors who are politically connected and 
then classify political directors based upon their individual characteristics. I explore three 
main political director characteristics: 1) political profile; 2) affiliation to the political party 
in power; and 3) length of government tenure. Also, I explore alternative measures for some 
political director characteristics, and perform several sensitivity analyses and robustness 
tests. I use five existing measures of tax avoidance: discretionary permanent book-tax 
differences, tax shelter prediction score, industry- and size-matched GAAP effective tax rate, 
GAAP effective tax rate, and cash effective tax rate.  
I find evidence that characteristics of political directors influence firms’ tax 
avoidance strategies, but there is variation in the extent of the benefit that some politically 
connected directors provide. For example, the evidence suggests that high-profile directors 
are associated with extreme forms of tax avoidance, but the level of tax aggressiveness varies 
among the different political profile types. Also, political directors affiliated with the political 
party that controls a branch of government is associated with aggressive tax strategies. 
However, the level of tax aggressiveness is higher when political directors are affiliated with 
the political party that controls Congress, compared to the political party that controls the 
white house. Lastly, I examine the association between political directors’ government tenure 
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and tax avoidance, and find that firms with politically connected directors with lengthy 
government service are associated with aggressive tax avoidance.  
 My study contributes to the literature on determinants of tax avoidance by providing 
evidence on the characteristics of politically connected directors that influence firms’ tax 
avoidance. I also contribute to research on the outcomes of corporate political activity by 
providing evidence on the mechanisms by which politically connected directors influence 
firms’ tax avoidance activities.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 .  
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APPENDIX I  
 
Variable Definitionsa, b, c  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent Variables (Tax Avoidance Proxies) 
DTAX discretionary permanent book-tax differences, calculated following Frank et al. (2009), which is residual 
from the following regression estimated by year and two-digit SIC code: 
 
PERMDIFFi,t  = α0 + α1INTANi,t + α2UNCONi,t + α3MIi,t + α4CSTEi,t  + α5NOLi,t + α6LAGPERMi,t     + εi,t 
  
where PERMDIFF is total book-tax difference less temporary book-tax difference: [{PI – [(TXFED + 
TXFO) / STR]} – (TXDI / STR)], scaled by lagged assets (AT); INTAN = goodwill and other intangible 
assets (INTAN), scaled by lagged assets; UNCON = income (loss) reported under the equity method 
(ESUB), scaled by lagged assets; MI = income (loss) attributable to minority interest (MII), scaled by 
lagged assets; CSTE = current state tax expense (TXS), scaled by lagged assets; NOL = change in net 
operating loss carryforwards (TLCF), scaled by lagged assets; LAGPERM = PERMDIFF in year t–1; 
and STR is the statutory tax rate; 
 
SHELTER indicator variable equal to one for forms in the top quintile of the predicted probability that the firm is 
engaged in tax sheltering, calculated following Wilson (2009): 
 
SHELTER = – 4.86 + 5.20BTD + 4.08DA – 1.41LEV + 0.76LAT + 3.51ROA + 1.72FI  
         + 2.43R&D 
 
where BTD is total book-tax difference, scaled by lagged total assets (AT); DA is the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals from the performance-adjusted modified cross-sectional Jones model; LEV is 
long-term debt (DLTT) divided by total assets (AT); LAT is the logarithm of total assets (AT); ROA is 
pre-tax earnings (PI) scaled by lagged total assets; FI is an indicator variable equal to one for firms with 
foreign income (PIFO), and zero otherwise; and R&D is research and development expenses (XRD) 
scaled by lagged total assets;   
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APPENDIX I (continued) 
 
TA_ETR  firm i’s mean industry- and size-matched GAAP ETR less firm i’s GAAP ETR, calculated following   
Balakrishnan et al. (2012). GAAP ETR equals the sum of total tax expense (TXT) from years t to t–2, 
divided by the sum of pre-tax income (PI) from years t to t–2. Mean industry- and size-matched GAAP  
  ETR is the mean GAAP ETR for the portfolio of firms in the same quintile of total assets and the same 
industry as the firm i, where size and industry are sorted independently and industry is based on Fama-
French 48 Industry Classes (Fama and French 1997); 
 
ETR sum of total tax expense (TXT) divided by pretax book income (PI) less special items (SPI) in year t; 
CETR sum of total cash taxes paid (TXPD) divided by pretax book income (PI) less special items (SPI) in year 
t; 
 
Variables of Interest 
PCD indicator variable equal to one if year t has at least one board member who was previously employed by 
the government; and zero if year t does not have a board member who was previously employed by the 
government; 
HIGH_PROFILE indicator variable equal to one if a politically connected director served as cabinet secretary, senator, 
congressman, governor, president, or vice-president, and zero otherwise; 
LOW_PROFILE indicator variable equal to one for firm-years without a high-profile director, and zero otherwise; 
AFFILIATE_1 indicator variable equal to one if a politically connected director’s last party affiliation before leaving 
political office controls either the House, Senate, or White House in firm-year t, and zero otherwise; 
NO_AFFILIATE_1 indicator variable equal to one for firm-years with no party alignment to the political party that controls 
the house, senate, or white house, and zero otherwise; 
AFFILIATE_2 indicator variable equal to one if a politically connected director’s last party affiliation before leaving 
political office controls both the House and Senate in firm-year t, and zero otherwise; 
NO_AFFILIATE_2 indicator variable equal to one for firm-years with no party alignment to the political party that controls 
the house and senate, and zero otherwise; 
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APPENDIX I (continued) 
 
AFFILIATE_3 indicator variable equal to one if a politically connected director’s last party affiliation before leaving 
political office controls the House, Senate, and White House in firm-year t, and zero otherwise; 
NO_AFFILIATE_3 indicator variable equal to one for firm-years with party alignment to the political party that controls the 
house senate, and white house, and zero otherwise; 
 
LN_GOVT_TENURE  natural log sum of the politically connected director’s years of government service; 
 
Control Variables 
ΔNOL change in tax-loss carryforward (TLCF) from t-1 to t scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year 
(AT); 
GEO_SEG logarithm of 1 plus the number of geographic segments (GEOSEG) reported in the Compustat Segment 
File; 
EQINC equity earnings in subsidiaries (ESUB) scaled by total sales (SALE) in year t. Missing values of equity 
earnings in subsidiaries are set to zero; 
INTANG  intangible assets (INTAN) in year t scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year (AT); 
PP&E net property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) in year t scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year 
(AT); 
ΔGDWL change in goodwill (GDWL) scaled by lagged total assets (AT). If change in goodwill decreases, then 
change in goodwill is set equal to zero; 
NEW_INVEST new investments, calculated as research and development expenses plus capital expenditures plus 
acquisitions less sale of property less depreciation and amortization (XRD + CAPX + AQC – SPPE – 
DPC), scaled by lagged total assets (AT); 
CASH  cash holdings at the end of the year (CHE) scaled by lagged total assets (AT); 
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APPENDIX I (continued) 
 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman index calculated as the sum of the squares of each industry segment’s sales as a 
percentage of total firm sales in year t. Industry concentration is measured with net sales (SALE); 
INDUSTRY indicator variable equal to one if firm i is a member of industry j. Industries are defined based on Fama-
French 48 Industry Classes (Fama and French 1997); 
 
Selection Model Variables 
ROA  ratio of pre-tax income (PI) in year t scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year (AT); 
NOL indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a tax loss carryforward (TLCF) during year t, zero 
otherwise; 
%FASSETS  foreign assets, calculated following Oler, Shevlin, Wilson (2007); 
SIZE natural log of market value of equity, measured as price per share times shares outstanding (PRCC_F x 
CSHO) at the beginning of year t; 
LEV  sum of long-term debt (DLTT) in year t scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year (AT); 
MTB market-to-book ratio for the beginning of year t, measured as market value of equity (PRCC_F x CSHO) 
divided by book value of equity (CEQ); 
PCT_IO  average percentage of shares held by institutional investors in year t (Thomson Reuters database); 
%POL_CONNECT  percentage of politically connected firms in firm i’s industry group; 
 
Other Variables 
PCD_TOTAL  number of politically connected directors in year t; 
LN_PCD_TOTAL  natural log of number of politically connected directors in year t; 
PCT_PCD the ratio of the total number of politically connected directors divided by total board size in year t; 
HIGHPROFILE_MORE indicator variable equal to one if a politically connected director served in more than one “high_profile” 
position, and zero otherwise; 
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APPENDIX I (continued) 
 
CAB_SEC indicator variable equal to one if a politically connected director served as a member of the president’s 
cabinet, and zero otherwise; 
SENATOR indicator variable equal to one if a politically connected director served as a senator, and zero otherwise; 
REP indicator variable equal to one if a politically connected director served as a member of the House of 
Representatives, and zero otherwise; 
GOV indicator variable equal to one if a politically connected director served as a state governor, and zero 
otherwise; 
PRES_VP indicator variable equal to one if a politically connected director served as a U.S. president or vice-
president, and zero otherwise; 
AFFILIATE_SENATE indicator variable equal to one if a politically connected director’s political party affiliate controls the 
Senate in year t, and zero otherwise; 
AFFILIATE_HOUSE indicator variable equal to one if a politically connected director’s political party affiliate controls the 
House of Representatives in year t, and zero otherwise; 
AFFILIATE_WHOUSE indicator variable equal to one if a politically connected director’s political party affiliate controls the 
White House in year t, and zero otherwise; 
AFFILIATE_CONGRESS indicator variable equal to one if a political director’s political party affiliate controls the Senate or 
House, and zero otherwise; 
DUAL_AFFILIATE indicator variable equal to one if more than one political director from different party affiliations serve 
simultaneously on the board, and zero otherwise; 
TAX_EXPERT indicator variable equal to one if a political director served on the Senate Finance Committee, Joint 
Committee on Taxation, or House Ways and Means Committee, or served as IRS Commissioner, and 
zero otherwise; 
NO_TAXEXPERT indicator variable equal to one for firm-years with no tax expert, and zero otherwise; 
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APPENDIX I (continued) 
 
TAXEXPERT_MORE indicator variable equal to one if a politically connected director served in more than one “tax expert” 
position, and zero otherwise; 
WAYS_MEANS indicator variable equal to one if a politically connected director served on the House Ways and Means 
Committee, and zero otherwise; 
FINANCE_CMTE indicator variable equal to one if a politically connected director served on the Senate Finance 
Committee, and zero otherwise; 
JCT indicator variable equal to one if a politically connected director served on the Joint Committee on 
Taxation, and zero otherwise; 
IRS_COMM indicator variable equal to one if a politically connected director served as IRS Commissioner, and zero 
otherwise; 
GOVT_TENURE number of years a politically connected director served in the government; 
BOARD_TOTAL number of directors on the board in year t; 
LN_BOARD_TOTAL natural log of the number of directors on the board in year t; 
BOARD_TENURE number of years a director served on the board. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________ 
a Unless otherwise noted, variables are measured on an annual basis. 
b Compustat data items are in parentheses. 
c All continuous variables are wisorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX II  
 
 
Additional Variables used in Kim and Zhang (2016) 
 
Variable Definitionsa, b, c  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Control Variables 
STDROA standard deviation of ROA from years t to t – 4; 
BUS_SEG logarithm of 1 plus the number of business segments (BUSSEG) reported in the Compustat Segment 
File; 
DACC absolute value of discretionary accruals, estimated from the performance-adjusted modified cross-
sectional Jones model; 
DUAL_CLASS indicator variable equal to one if the firm has more than one class of stock, zero otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________ 
a Unless otherwise noted, variables are measured on an annual basis. 
b Compustat data items are in parentheses. 
c All continuous variables are wisorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
